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Abstract 
 
We introduce a new approach to behaviour change called ‘Evo-Eco’ because of its 
intellectual roots in evolutionary biology and ecological psychology. This approach is 
based on the inference that behaviour evolved as a system designed through 
evolutionary history to provide adaptive responses to rapidly changing or complex 
environmental conditions. A need for behaviour change should therefore arise when 
individuals fail to learn appropriately from experience, due to some mismatch 
between environmental stimuli and learning mechanisms, leading to inappropriate 
behaviour. The approach therefore begins from a well-established model of how 
agents typically learn from experience of particular environmental circumstances – 
the reinforcement learning model. This basic model is then expanded to determine in 
greater detail what kinds of learning failures can occur. Consideration of findings from 
the sciences relevant to components of the learning model – ranging from 
evolutionary biology, to ecology and psychology – leads to the development of this 
new model of behaviour change, which also serves as a theoretically justified check-
list of factors for practitioners to examine during program development. We also 
report that the approach has been used to develop effective public health programs 
involving behaviour change, as well as to novel predictions about behavioural causes 
(i.e., placement within a routine) which have proved to impact on the ability to change 
a behaviour. We therefore hope that the Evo-Eco approach will be used by public 
health workers and, more generally, by (social) marketers to devise more effective 
campaigns, by policy-makers to improve general well-being, and by the general 
public as inspiration for their own self-help projects.  
 
Introduction 
 
Behaviour change has recently come to be recognized as an important objective of public policy, 
marketing, education, business management (leadership), health promotion, city planning (to 
improve the design of buildings and public spaces to promote health or interaction), sport 
psychology (to improve performance), website design (to improve the ‘user experience’), and self-
help efforts (e.g., financial goal achievement). It is being heralded as a policy cure-all in the halls 
of government, as a way to improve student learning in schools, or to make marketing more 
scientific, and as a necessary lynch-pin of successful programs in public health. Behaviour change 
is thus a ‘hot topic’ in many fields.  
 
The concept of behaviour change implies that preferable courses of action are perceived as 
possible, but tend not to occur. It is often seen as being ‘hard’. Failed New Year’s resolutions and 
dieting regimes are given as examples. However, changes in behaviour are happening 
everywhere, all the time. Social life has changed considerably: we now live in megalopolises, fly 
 2
from continent to continent. Some people now cope with multiple shifts in their jobs over their 
career (whereas people used to be born and die in the same profession, or even just all to have 
the same profession, such as farmer), and participate in numerous social networks (e.g., church 
members, bridge club, work groups, sports teams, hobby clubs), rather than just being kin or 
neighbours. People have learned to deal with novel institutions: children spend half their daily lives 
in school; many people now people use coins or pieces of paper to trade for things, keep some of 
their money in a bank, or use ‘virtual money’ in the form of credit cards or Paypal accounts. People 
take regular baths, give birth in hospitals, drive cars, wear glasses or hearing aids, and fling dirty 
dishes into a dishwasher. In 1985, no one could telephone others while they were ‘on the run’; 
twenty-five years later, many people in the poorest villages in Africa are using mobile phones. The 
internet has disrupted many old behaviours since its introduction around 1995: interpersonal 
communication (letter-writing to email to twitter), consumption patterns (physical to on-line 
shopping), even reading books (on screens rather than in printed form). In fact, for this 
increasingly important kind of behaviour change – learning to live with new technologies – the rate 
of adoption is becoming faster with time: mobile phones have become endemic in only a few years, 
whereas regular showering took many years to become popular 
(http://www.karlhartig.com/chart/techhouse.pdf) So in many ways, human psychology is 
exquisitely tuned to producing the most appropriate response to what a changing environment 
throws up. The rate at which populations can change their behaviour is actually increasing.  
 
This is possible because human behaviour is highly flexible; it responds rapidly to changes in the 
environment. Not all organisms can do this (e.g., can’t respond to rapid environmental changes, or 
have narrow diet or niche), and as a result may go extinct. (Martínez‐Meyer, Townsend 
Peterson, & Hargrove, 2004)  Even complex behaviours can be programmed by genes if the 
environment remains stable long enough. However, in stochastic environments, the optimal 
course of action can change more rapidly than genetic changes can track. Further, if many tasks 
must be achieved through behaviour, competition and conflict can arise between goals, requiring 
contextualized switching between tasks, which also means the optimal course of behaviour at a 
given moment can be different. So species such as animals that depend on behaviour for solving 
many tasks can also run into decision-making problems.  
 
Adaptive behaviour in complex or stochastic environments thus requires flexibility. The ability to 
reliably produce quick, responsive kinds of interaction with stochastic environments was enabled 
by the development of a nervous system, which had the ability to detect and classify the situation, 
as well to store information that could be of benefit in selecting appropriate responses when 
encountering similar conditions later – that is, the ability to learn from experience. (R Aunger & 
Curtis, accepted; Freeman, 1999; Sterelny, 2003) The nervous system is thus able, first, to direct 
complex movements of various body parts relatively quickly, and second, to store information 
acquired through feedback from behavioural choices in the form of memory. Only animals have 
nervous systems. It is the combination of rapid behavioural learning, in response to environmental 
changes, enabled by nervous systems, that characterizes the animal mega-adaptation. Complex 
behaviour – such as humans exhibit – thus has the purpose of keeping bodies alive and 
reproducing through rapid, flexible self-propelled bodily movement, producing a functional 
interaction between an animal and its environment. (R Aunger & Curtis, accepted; Millikan, 2000; 
Plotkin, 1988; Tinbergen, 1963)  
 
Animals have had to succeed under conditions that require a high degree of flexibility, as their 
environments tend to fluctuate rapidly. (Huey, Hertz, & Sinervo, 2003; Wcislo, 1989; Wyles, 
Kunkel, & Wilson, 1983) Indeed, human evolution has been characterized by particularly violent 
and shifting selection pressures, as a result of environmental fluctuations, particularly over the last 
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10,000 years. (Quartz, 2001; Richerson & Boyd, 2005) This history has left its mark in terms of a 
large brain for coping with these rapid changes. Indeed, we can be said to have evolved 
particularly large brains to cope with recurrent environmental variability during our evolution. (Potts, 
2012) Further, as discussed above, environmental changes have only increased in speed with 
more recent technological developments. So we are becoming more and more reliant on 
producing adaptively plastic or flexible responses to changing environmental conditions.  
 
This evolutionary perspective suggests that, if there is a need to change behavioural responses to 
particular situations, it must be due to some inability to adapt appropriately to environmental 
change through the usual evolutionary mechanisms. Indeed, we will argue that the need to change 
behaviour has arisen because environmental conditions exist that prohibit effective learning and 
hence performance of the appropriate behavioural choice. We will show below that, under certain 
conditions, learning does not work adaptively, so that particular kinds of discrepancies can arise 
between what the environment throws up, and how psychological mechanisms can gain 
knowledge from experience of those situations. Further, those situations tend to be the ones in 
which people seek to induce changes in behaviour – either in themselves, or others.  
 
This paper presents the case for a new approach to behaviour change founded on this insight 
about learning difficulties. In subsequent sections, the approach will be presented in several 
different forms – as a model of behaviour change (couched in terms of a general learning model), 
as a model of behavior determination (more consistent with how other models of behaviour 
change are presented), and as a model of how behaviour has itself developed over evolutionary 
history, which provides a checklist of issues for behaviour change specialists to consider when 
developing interventions. These presentations will require the development of several different 
perspectives on the general problem of behaviour change and an investigation of the best 
available science for indicators as to the contents of the various model components. In the 
process, we show how the approach accounts for the types of problems which become public 
health problems in the first place, and why they require behaviour change. We discuss projects 
where this approach has been used successfully to change recalcitrant behaviour, and conclude 
with an exhortation to use the approach in future behaviour change efforts. 
Failures to learn 
 
To better understand how learning can fail to happen appropriately, we here model how learning is 
supposed to work, so that we can pinpoint the ways in which the system can break down.  
Making optimal choices about how to behave can be a difficult proposition, partly because of the 
‘credit assignment problem’ (Richard S Sutton, 1984): Outcomes in complex situations may 
depend on a series of actions, only the last of which provides a reward or punishment. This means 
that feedback can be delayed, and it can be difficult to determine where the decision-making 
process ‘went wrong’. Think of a chess game, in which you play for 50 moves and lose – how can 
you learn which move doomed you to failure in the end – the 3rd move, the 23rd, or the 43rd?  
Reinforcement learning (RL) is an algorithm that can solve this problem. (Richard S Sutton & Barto, 
1998) Although originally developed in computer science to study machine learning and the 
optimum control of production processes, (Richard S Sutton & Barto, 1998) it has also been widely 
used in psychology and neuroscience. RL is currently the best-established computational model of 
how autonomous agents such as animals and robots acquire information through experience with 
their environment. Indeed, RL has been independently validated, using different kinds of criteria 
and standards of practice, in four very different fields: control theory/operations research, artificial 
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intelligence/machine learning, neuroscience and psychology. (Richard S Sutton, 2009) 
Reinforcement learning is designed to describe the everyday processes by which agents learn, via 
trial and error, to act upon a changing environment so as to maximize a future stream of rewards, 
based on only partial knowledge of their world. RL explains how animals or robots can adapt their 
behavior to varying contingencies by repeatedly updating their estimates of the rewarding value of 
alternative actions, thanks to feedback received from the environment as a consequence of action. 
This can lead, over time, to different responses to the same stimulus – behaviour change. Thus, 
reinforcement learning suggests that learning is about correcting errors. (Rescorla & Wagner, 
1972) Hence, if learning fails, errors persist – potentially requiring an intervention to change 
behaviour.  
From this perspective, the agent’s job is to identify a policy that maps perceived states of the world 
to actions which maximizes some measure of long-term reinforcement. Reinforcement signals can 
be computed at various points during the time over which a goal is being pursued. Learning occurs 
whenever there are discrepancies between the level of reward that is expected from a behaviour 
and that actually received after it has been executed. A ‘temporal difference error’ proportional to 
the difference between the time at which the behaviour was selected, and the point at which 
feedback comes from the environment) alerts the system to situations in which the change in 
value of the current state from the previous state (brought about through behaviour) are 
significantly different from what was expected (e.g., not as much progress toward achievement of 
the goal as believed). (Schultz, 2000; Richard S Sutton & Barto, 1998) This allows the brain to 
adjust expected levels of reward during in the process of goal achievement, and hence produce 
adaptive responses to changing circumstances. (Waelti, Dickinson, & Schultz, 2001) 
Reinforcement learning is a form of operant or instrumental conditioning – the kind of learning 
associated with performing a behaviour, rather than simply being exposed to, and learning about, 
relationships between environmental stimuli (i.e., classical conditioning). 1 Further, reinforcement 
learning involves variation (generated behavioural options) and selection mechanisms (i.e., action 
selection among options). Also, it includes memory and learning facilities, which start from where 
the last iteration stopped, so there is an inheritance mechanism for informational states as well. 
These qualities make reinforcement learning an evolutionary process. (Fernando, Szathmáry, & 
Husbands, 2012; Moriarty, Schultz, & Grefenstette, 1999; Singh, Lewis, Barto, & Sorg, 2010; 
Whiteson & Stone, 2006) (Variation, selection and inheritance are the basic elements of the 
‘Darwinian algorithm’ (Godfrey-Smith, 2007; Lewontin, 1970).) What this suggests is that organic 
selection in populations of organisms is mimicked by the operation of the nervous system, where 
evolution takes place within the lifetimes of organisms in terms of how their behaviour is selected 
and produced. In effect, the fundamental mechanisms of biology (natural selection) and 
psychology (behaviour production) can be shown to be computationally equivalent. (McDowell, 
2010) This gives reinforcement learning a very strong foundation, by falling within central 
theoretical and empirical traditions in both biology and psychology.  
The model adopted in this paper to understand behaviour change – which embodies a version of 
reinforcement learning – can be seen in Figure 1 (based on Figure 1 from (Singh et al., 2010)). 
This representation can be thought of as two causal loops – since the brain lies within body, and 
the body within the environment – but is presented as spatially independent loops for pictorial 
clarity. (An embedded version is presented later.)  
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Figure 1: The Evo-Eco Process Model  
 
 
 
 
The basic reinforcement learning model has been augmented to make it more realistic in 
ecological terms. This is necessary as the reinforcement learning literature was originally purely 
computational (or information-theoretic) in nature. In particular, the body is given physical reality 
by adding physiological processes of metabolism and arousal, while the environment is allowed to 
provide the body with resources such as food and social companionship. The environment is also 
granted endogenous responses, because it includes other agents like animals as well as other 
humans, and so will respond adaptively to behavioural stimulation by the focal individual. Further, 
the brain also responds to rewards and perceived changes to the environment by updating its 
model of the world (learning) and storing this information for later use (memory). 2  
 
According to the model, a cycle of behaviour causation begins in the brain, which, based on 
current knowledge of the state of the world, uses the RL algorithm to compute the value of various 
behavioural options. Based on these values, an action selection process picks the highest valued 
option, and instructs the motor cortex to perform the selected ‘policy’ (or action sequence), which 
is stored as the optimal option for that situation (for future use). These instructions cause a 
metabolic response and arousal in the body, which produces behaviour, or interaction between the 
body and its environment. (Odling-Smee, Laland, & Feldman, 2003) Behaviour results in a change 
to the state of the environment (e.g., chasing a prey causes a change in location of one’s body in 
relation to the physical surroundings), which can cause endogenous reactions by the environment 
(e.g., a prey avoids capture by engaging in independent movement). The consequences of 
behaviour are thus a combination of the activity of the body and the environmental response. This 
outcome is what is sensed by the body, as the first sort of feedback. Resources can also be 
acquired through the behaviour (e.g., meat through capture of the prey). Consumption or use of 
the resources provides changes to the peripheral nervous system, transmitted to the brain, which 
also converts the sensations from the peripheral nervous system into perceptions of changes in 
the environment and the body’s internal states. On this basis, the brain calculates a reward as the 
information from perception and resources acquired minus the metabolic/arousal costs of 
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producing the behaviour in the first place. Rewards are subjective, or psychological – positive if 
the action resulted in an environmental change consistent with the animal’s goal (e.g., chasing a 
prey resulted in the prey being captured), or negative if not. Learning and memory then take place 
as endogenous changes in the brain. The brain allows the animal to associate the perceived 
changes produced in the environment by the behaviour with the resulting reward (positive or 
negative) from prior action selection – an instance of reinforcement learning.  
 
Note that the process runs repeatedly: that is, after learning is complete, in the next time-frame, 
the cycle begins anew, with the animal selecting another action, given the new state of the 
environment, and getting feedback in the form of a reward and perception of new changes in the 
environment, resulting from the new behaviour. Thanks to reinforcement learning, actions that lead 
to positive rewards tend to be repeated when similar circumstances present themselves again. 
Over time, the animal learns to perform actions that tend to result in high payoffs – as expected if 
behaviour is an adaptation to produce effective responses to a variety of environmental conditions. 
Indeed, robots programmed with reinforcement learning algorithms come to perform behavioural 
patterns consistent with expectations from evolutionary theories about behaviour. For example, 
teams of robots using different strategies allocate their energy in ‘food quests’ in ways consistent 
with competition between species in the same niche from optimal foraging theory. (Ulam & Balch, 
200?)  
 
This augmented model we call the Evo-Eco Process Model, due to its roots in evolutionary theory 
and its attention to ecological factors. 3 (Figure 1 is called a ‘process model’ to distinguish it from 
another representation of the approach to follow later.) The model also includes the possibility of 
an intervention, as the primary means of inducing behaviour change. An intervention is typically 
itself a form of behaviour by an outside party (e.g., a message spoken to a friend, or putting a 
billboard on the side of a bus), but this behaviour may have already occurred (e.g., in the form of 
an environmental modification with which the target behaviour will interact), or only be planned 
(with the intention to see how the intervention will influence other model elements), or be 
unnecessary (as in the case of a self-induced decision to lose weight through a self-help program) 
– hence the link is represented as a dotted line in the model.  
 
With its concentration on feedback loops between the brain, body and environment, and the 
possibility of interjecting some novel element into the cycle, the Evo-Eco Process Model has 
structural similarities to the existing approaches to behaviour change (as opposed to behaviour 
determination): Social Regulation Theory (Carver & Scheier, 1998), the Antecedent-Behaviour-
Consequence (or ABC) model used in Applied Behavioural Analysis, (Martin & Pear, 2007) and 
the Transtheoretical approach. (Prochaska & DiClemente, 1983) They are all composed of 
positive feedback loops (see Figure 2). 4 In effect, no model of change has been developed that 
doesn’t involve an intervention at some point in the body-environmental interaction – a 
modification which, once induced, then feeds forward to the other model components. This 
suggests that there is something fundamental about seeing change in cyclical terms – a point with 
which our approach is consistent. 
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Figure 2: Behaviour Change Models 
 
 
 
Learning is not the only brain function which has been characterised as using error correction as a 
mechanism. Error correction has also been demonstrated to characterize the following specific 
domains: perception (as minimization of ‘prediction coding’) (Rao & Ballard, 1999), action selection 
(as the ‘neuroeconomic principle’ to maximize expected utility) (Montague & Berns, 2002), 
memory (as world model updating to minimize ‘surprisal’) (K. Friston, 2010), and motor control (as 
‘forward modeling’ to minimize the discrepancy between expected and perceived body position). 
(Shadmehr, Smith, & Krakauer, 2010) As a result, there is a growing consensus that error 
correction should be recognized as a mechanism characteristic of the brain’s operation as a whole. 
Authors reaching this conclusion have been called this perspective the ‘Bayesian brain’ (Doya, 
2007), the ‘predictive brain’ (Bubic, Von Cramon, & Schubotz, 2010), and the ‘proactive brain’ (Bar, 
2007), and the global mechanism itself the ‘free energy principle’, (K. J. Friston & Stephan, 2007) 
‘failure modes’ (Redish, 2013), and ‘nested intelligence’. (Hawkins & Blakeslee, 2004) 
Only a few behaviours do not participate in the normal error-correction-based learning process, 
but these are the ones that everyone focuses on, as they cause problems, or are otherwise less-
than-optimal from some perspective (e.g., not enough sales or market share). The ‘behaviour 
change problem’ is therefore one of overcoming learning difficulties. From this perspective, the 
problem is that some behaviours are persistently resistant to change. People know they should do 
their home-work, clean house, save money for retirement, quit smoking, eat healthier diets and 
exercise more, but find it difficult to actually do so. Typically these behaviours affect large groups 
of people, and so become problematic, both at an individual and public level. It is only in these few 
cases that behaviour has ‘gone wrong’, and yet can’t be modified effectively. So behaviour change 
isn’t hard per se, it’s only hard when you notice there’s a problem, because the desired change 
isn’t happening. 
 
Overcoming error correction failures means knowing more about how learning normally occurs, to 
understand how it can go wrong. The Evo-Eco Approach is the result of an effort to design an 
approach to behaviour change that takes its inspiration from this insight.  
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The Evo-Eco Approach 
 
To properly assist those seeking to change behaviour, we need to develop our model of 
reinforcement learning so that it can address specific learning failures and show us how to change 
the flow of these different processes into desired channels. In effect, each of the Evo-Eco Model 
components need to be ‘opened up’ to see what kinds of factors it brings into play – how exactly it 
might help funnel behaviour into functional channels, and lead to learning successes in specific 
kinds of circumstances. The foundation of the approach is a specific learning model: the 
reinforcement learning model, which describes how the brain changes as a result of interaction 
with the environment via the body within which it resides (hence the spatial configuration of the 
components in Figure 3, the component-based version of the Evo-Eco model, which places the 
brain inside a body which is, in turn, in an environment). The basic elements of the model are  
 
 the environment, which presents some challenge to the individual 
 the brain, which produces potential responses to that challenge, and 
 the body, which engages in interactions with the environment (i.e., produces behaviour) 
that meaningfully changes that environment.  
 
Next, then, we consider each of these components at greater depth, bringing to bear, in each case, 
the latest relevant science to better understand what content exists within that element of the 
model. We will organize this discussion, however, in evolutionary terms, showing how the content 
of each component has developed at crucial intervals in the history of animals leading to humans. 
This is because the means by which behaviour is produced has itself changed over the course of 
evolutionary history. These different ways remain in place within the human brain as separate 
mechanisms of behaviour production, (R Aunger & Curtis, accepted) but an understanding of 
origins will help when it comes to trying to change behaviour.  
 
Brain (including psychological responses) 
 
The first component to be discussed is the brain. The most important thing to note here is that the 
brain is an evolved organ adapted to produce behaviour that promotes survival and reproduction 
of its body. (R Aunger & Curtis, accepted; Churchland & Sejnowski, 1992; Freeman, 1999; Hebb, 
1949; Llinas, 2002; Swanson, 2003) As such, it has a long evolutionary history during which it has 
acquired a variety of adaptations. Primary among these are mechanisms for controlling behaviour. 
Three levels of control have evolved in human brains, each of which can be isolated 
neuroscientifically. (N.D. Daw, Gershman, Seymour, Dayan, & Dolan, 2011; N. D. Daw, Niv, & 
Dayan, 2005; Dayan, Niv, Seymour, & D Daw, 2006; Edmund T Rolls, 1999; Wunderlich, Dayan, 
& Dolan, 2012) We will take the points at which these different control mechanisms have evolved 
as our crucial steps in the development of behaviour production in humans. Responses to 
behaviour take the form of learning and memory mechanisms associated with each level of control.  
 
The baseline for behavioural control comes when early invertebrates such as jellyfish and worms 
appeared (about 600 million years ago). The first control mechanism to have evolved, and which 
remains characteristic of invertebrates, was simple reactions to environmental stimuli that likely 
represented opportunities or threats. This is Pavlovian decision-making, which entails the release 
of species-specific approach and avoidance reactions in response to unconditioned or conditioned 
stimuli (i.e., reflexes). (Pavlov, 1927) So, recognition of a potential food item would inspire 
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approach among these early animal species, and contact with a poison would inspire recoil. 
(Abramson, 1994; Krasne & Glanzman, 1995)  
 
 
Figure 3: The Evo-Eco Component Model 
 
 
 
 
At this level of relatively simple nervous systems, learning is restricted to basic forms of 
conditioning, or acquiring associations between stimuli, or between stimuli and behavioural 
responses. (Mackintosh, 1985; Staddon, 2003) The result is incremental learning of relatively 
inflexible stimulus-action relationships that are released upon exposure to certain environmental 
stimuli. This reactive-level learning is based on the Hebbian rule whereby neurons that ‘fire 
together, wire together’, (Hebb, 1949) such that associations become stronger through experience. 
For example, in fear conditioning, an animal acquires avoidance responses to a previously neutral 
stimulus when it becomes paired with an aversive stimulus, such as a shock or loud noise. 
Reactive level learning is called ‘classical conditioning’ by animal behaviour researchers. It 
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involves attaching a new link to an existing cluster of knowledge (e.g., faeces tastes awful, so the 
animal will recognize faeces next time as something to avoid tasting). It is Pavlovian in the sense 
that learning to associate an unconditioned stimulus (bad taste) with a conditioned one (the sight 
of faeces). Such learning is also predictive in the sense that faeces will now be expected to taste 
bad whenever it comes into view, even without the experience – a learned aversion. (Dayan et al., 
2006) A special form of Pavlovian learning is ‘evolutionary prepared’ learning mechanisms such as 
the Garcia effect, a mechanism that trains the body to avoid poisonous substances after only a 
single exposure, due to its significance for survival. (Garcia & Koelling, 1966) These acquired 
(rather than innate) automatisms are commonly called ‘habits’. (Lally, Jaarsveld, Potts, & Wardle, 
2009; Ouellette & Wood, 1998) 
 
The first novelty in behaviour production occurred with the arrival of mammals around 200 million 
years ago. The psychological adaptation characteristic of mammals is motivational control for goal 
achievement. (Butler, 2001; Northcutt & Kaas, 1995; Streidter, 2005; Willis, 1985) Goals are 
mentally represented end-states that are calculated to be achieved through some sequence of 
behaviours. The existence of goals enabled new forms of learning because satisfying the goal can 
be accompanied by psychological rewards that promote the same behaviour the next time the 
situation arises. This is achieved by associating the positive outcome with whatever mental 
mechanisms produced the behaviour in the first place (i.e., evaluative learning). For example, 
signals from peripheral parts of the body can be sent to the brain to indicate the current status of 
various tissues and organs (e.g., hunger), that instigate searches for an improved state (e.g., food 
consumption). In this way, animals can learn a potentially arbitrary policy to obtain rewards or 
avoid punishments (e.g., a rat can learn to press a lever in one location so that food becomes 
available in another location). Learning can now rely on mental representations, or clusters of 
associations, so that associations between clusters constitutes a higher-order form of associative 
learning. Goal-states can come to be associated with the characteristics of events that lead to 
occurrence of the desired end-state; these characteristics make the goal more or less salient (e.g., 
water-holes may become associated with capture of prey if prey are often successfully 
encountered at water-holes). (B W Balleine & Dickinson, 1998; Berridge & Robinson, 2003) This 
style of learning will be called affective, as it is designed to help animals achieve rewards via goal 
satisfaction. It uses the temporal difference error rule discovered by reinforcement learning 
researchers to associate the animal’s current state with its degree of progress toward the current 
goal, working sometimes with respect to mentally represented states that only have psychological 
value, not resource value (i.e., a state that is leading the animal to, or correlated with, 
achievements of a state that will provide resources).  
 
Emotional memory is associated with affective learning. It is a facility for storing affectively-
charged experiences and associations, particularly those representing significant opportunities or 
threats, and hence likely to produce large rewards or punishments. (Burke, Heuer, & Reisberg, 
1992; Kensinger & Corkin, 2004; Valentin, Dickinson, & O’Doherty, 2007)  
 
Also associated with the development of a reward system and goal representation are motives, or 
psychological adaptations for achieving particular kinds of goals. These goals are associated with 
solving elementary evolutionary tasks such as finding food or a mate. Which motives a species 
can be expected to exhibit are determined by the niche in which the species lives, which in turn 
define the evolutionary problems it must solve to flourish and reproduce. (R Aunger & Curtis, 
accepted) All animals must find food, many must find a mate (if they depend on sexual 
reproduction), fewer must climb the social ladder of status (because only a few animals are social, 
much less have social hierarchies). The means by which each of these niche-based tasks is 
solved depend on the species’ evolutionary history (e.g., some species solve the food problem by 
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scavenging, others by being predators). The various human motives will be described below, as 
their roles become relevant.  
 
When primates evolved about 65 million years ago, a third level of control arose, called ‘executive’ 
control, based on the ability to run through imagined scenarios of future outcomes. This 
deliberative level of decision-making entails search and evaluation of action options through a 
representation of the causal structure of the world. (Tolman, 1948) This can be thought of as 
occurring through recursive test-operation-test-exit units operating on hierarchical mental modules 
(Kopp, 2012) – a straight-forward application of the cybernetic principle on which reinforcement 
learning is built.  
 
In reinforcement learning terms, executive level learning is instantiated as an actor-critic model (a 
member of the class of ‘model-based’ learning mechanisms). (Richard S Sutton, 1984) The ‘actor’ 
is the map (or database of world knowledge), which gets feedback from the reward system, so it 
learns new facts about the world (e.g., where food can be found, or more declarative memory 
items), while the ‘critic’ (equivalent to the temporal difference-based system, which executive level 
mechanisms makes use of) updates the expected value of the just-performed behaviour, based on 
the same reward feedback signal as is fed to the ‘actor’. Thus, the executive level just adds the 
‘actor’ part to the motivational system. Executive level learning is more about new memory 
resources than new learning mechanisms.  
 
Learning at this level can be associated with hierarchical goals, or sub-goals that represent 
achievement of mid-states that reflect some conceptual or functional clustering (e.g., being the first 
stage of a process that results in resource acquisition, such as boiling a pot of water for tea). 
Goals at any level of the hierarchy are evaluated using the same temporal difference error 
mechanism as works at the motivational level. 
 
Some of the processing occurring at this level bubbles into consciousness, which is a limited 
‘theatre’ in which memory and other information is pulled together for decision-making and other 
tasks. (Baars, 1997) Declarative memory is again a specialized mechanism for remembering the 
specifics of particular experiences, such as the license plate number of the car that just hit 
someone on the street, or the name of a second cousin. (Eichenbaum, 2000; Tulving, 1985) 
Declarative memory allows humans to develop highly specific scenarios based on detailed 
information, and thus weigh up very complex chains of potential future actions against one another. 
Identity is a special form of declarative memory as a stored representation of the self that 
(associated with executive control). For behaviour change, another important form of memory is 
social norms: People have ideas (based on experience) about what other people do (descriptive 
norms), and what other people think they should do (prescriptive norms), which can impact on 
their own behaviour (through the motives to affiliate or increase status).  
 
Thus, for each level of mental control over behaviour, there is an affiliated adaptation for the 
storage and recall of information specific to the control task at that level. There is also a specific 
mechanism for learning at each level, which at the executive level is conceptual learning. This is a 
recursive form of earlier learning, in that it now can work with even more deeply embedded mental 
representations, such as a model of the self placed within a model of the external world. Learning 
can also come from the conscious rehearsal of recent failures or successes, or from the rehearsal 
of possible future action-sequences using our strong narrative-producing mechanisms – 
something we call reflective learning. (Joe, Ferraro, & Schwartz, 2002; Edmund T. Rolls, 2005)  
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All three behaviour determination or control systems are operating all the time, in parallel, in order 
not to waste experience. (Dayan, lecture) Having multiple decision-making systems allows the 
brain to make use of controllers with different advantages. Model-based (forward search) is a good 
policy when close to reward (not many steps to search) and there is little time for training; model-
free (rely on cached knowledge) is more appropriate when the agent has lots of experience and 
the distance to reward is not too important. Reactive level determination is best when there is little 
margin for error (e.g., the consquences of a wrong decision impact on morbidity or mortality). So a 
general rule is, if an animal has experienced only few trials of a particular circumstance, it should 
use executive level production (because it will be able to produce some estimate of the likely 
returns to behaviour by searching the relevant solution space); if it has more experience, it should 
use learned automatic responses (i.e., habits). On the other hand, if prior generations have had 
similar experiences, their correct responses might have been encoded in Pavlovian reactive 
mechanisms producing ‘hard-wired’ responses. (Talmi, Seymour, Dayan, & Dolan, 2008)  
 
Thus, with each increasing degree of sophistication over the production of behaviour, there are 
psychological adaptations for selecting among more and more complex sequences of behaviours, 
which can be put together based on information recalled from specific forms of memory that store 
just the kinds of information needed to construct those mental representations of future activity. 
But this means there is competition at any given moment between them. Thus, there must be 
some mechanism for integrating between them (i.e., a meta-control mechanism). There is growing 
evidence that they are integrated. (N. D. Daw et al., 2005; N.D. Daw & Shohamy, 2008) The 
control of behavior can be shifted from one system to another through focal brain lesions, 
suggesting the coexistence of neurally distinct decision making systems. (B.W Balleine & 
O’Dohety, 2010; A. Dickinson & Balleine, 2002) Choice between systems is to trust the one which 
is more confident of its recommendation (i.e., habit when lots of experience and low uncertainty, 
model-based when opposite conditions), so getting expected value with uncertainty. (N. D. Daw et 
al., 2005) 
 
There are significant interactions between levels of control over behaviour production and 
evaluation. In particular, habit formation is a specialized mechanism that progresses control 
through each of the three levels of control through repeated experience. (A Dickinson, 1985; 
Everitt & Robbins, 2005; Yin & Knowlton, 2006) It can begin with a conscious decision to acquire a 
new behaviour, progress to motivated behaviour, and, through continued learning in regular 
environments, end up as a practiced automatism. Over time, repeated temporal-difference 
learning can lead to reduced errors, at least in stable environments, until the errors are essentially 
eliminated, at which point the brain releases control to reactive level production (i.e., the response 
becomes habitual). (Pasupathy & Miller, 2005) This is Thorndike’s ‘law of effect’. (Thorndike, 
1901) In each step, repeated reinforcement leads to reducing the level of control necessary for 
continued behaviour production, ending up with fast-acting, automatic responses to environmental 
cues using a purely reactive level of control. (Poldrack et al., 2005) With this kind of Pavlovian 
control, actions are automatically elicited at the presentation of reinforcers, whether or not the 
actions lead to acquiring rewards or avoiding punishments. (Breland & Breland, 1961; Dayan et al., 
2006) In humans, procedural memory is an adaptation to help recall the skills necessary to 
execute what have become automatic behavioural responses. (Bullemer, Nissen, & Willingham, 
1989; Squire, 2004)  
 
Other interactions between control mechanisms like this no doubt await discovery. However, these 
complexities can also lead to problems. Reactive, affective and reflective learning mechanisms 
can interact in complex ways that introduce structural constraints on learning. Interactions among 
these various brain structures can constrain learning in ways that lead to maladaptive outcomes, 
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regardless of changes in the environment, as they have evolved to serve different ends and then 
been forced to work together. Alternatively, some forms of interaction between complex 
reinforcement learning mechanisms and environmental stimuli, or unexpected endogenous 
responses by the environment to behaviour, may also cause problems. Thus, kinds of difficulties 
that lead to a need for behaviour change can arise within the brain, or in the environment as a 
stimulus for learning, or in environmental responses as well. Interactions of various kinds among 
the elements of the Evo-Eco model (or even within a structured brain) can thus be the source of a 
need to change behaviour.  
 
Body (including physiological responses) 
 
Second is the body in which the brain resides. The body is our ‘primary interface’ with the 
environment, how we modify our surroundings, through behaviour, to better suit our needs. Two 
aspects of the body are important when considering how it produces behaviour. First, any body 
has a morphological nature – that is, its precise shape determines what sorts of movements can 
be undertaken. For example, the body’s size in part determines how much force can be applied to 
environmental objects (e.g., how far a stone of a certain weight can be thrown). For example, the 
precise shape of the beak of the various Darwin’s finches determines which feeding niche they 
occupy, as it determines which sorts of nuts and seeds can be successfully consumed. (Grant & 
Grant, 2002) Internal body morphology is also relevant. Thus reptiles and birds produce eggs, 
which need specific forms of care and defense as compared to the live offspring produced by 
mammals. For these reasons, there tends to be a tight relationship between body morphology and 
a species’ niche.  
 
Once we get to humans however, each body morphology, being unique, and visible to others in 
the social group, also gives people an ethnic, gendered, age-grouped identity, which is stored and 
modified by experience in declarative memory (the kind of memory associated with executive 
control). Social roles are important as part of identity as well, and became individuated with the 
multifarious division of labour that accompanies membership in the large groups that humans live 
in. This identity can also include psychological aspects: cultural beliefs, traits of various kinds 
(such as personality and mood), and episodic memories from one’s personal past (a specific form 
of declarative memory). These are obviously psychological in nature, but arise as a consequence 
of the body’s unique appearance and experience. Similarly, long-term biases in the performance 
of behaviour (e.g., mood, personality-based traits) can also be thought of as being associated with 
the constancy of the body, rather than the constant turmoil of the brain, and so as having some 
physiological element (e.g., as reflecting general excitability). (Glenberg, 2010; Michalak et al., 
2009) Skills, or the ability to perform highly practiced behaviours well, such as athletic feats or 
complex everyday behaviours, are also often thought of as embodied, given that they become 
embedded in ‘muscle memory’, or the peripheral nervous system. (Gallagher, 2005)  
 
The body produces physiological changes in response to signals from the brain that action is 
imminent. Arousal (increasing activation of the autonomic nervous and endocrine systems, leading 
to increased heart rate, blood pressure and sensory awareness in the presence of a threat or 
opportunity in preparation for action) can be considered as part of the metabolic system from this 
perspective. Arousal is also a way the body prepares for goal pursuit, (Hull, 1943; James, 1884; 
Yerkes & Dodson, 1908) so it can be considered an adaptation arising with mammals to ‘energize’ 
motivated action. Arousal is the body’s endogenous response to information from the brain about 
an action having been selected.  
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Second, engaging in movements such as behaviour requires physical energy, which in turn 
requires mobilization of the body’s chemical machinery for producing kinetic energy – that is, the 
body’s metabolism. The body thus experiences an energy drain as a consequence of engaging in 
behaviour; against this, it can acquire resources (e.g., through prey capture).  
 
Causation is also reversed in the sense that the brain is impacted by residing in a body. For 
example, reinforcement learning can reflect embodiment, taking place specifically with reference 
to which parts of the body help achieve goals – that is, the algorithm can be modularized to 
include multiple reinforcement processes for each relevant part. For example, when actions are 
produced via simultaneous movement of both hands, a model suggesting left and right hands 
received separate reward feedback for each hand movement produced better predictions of 
chosen behavior than a traditional model that treated the actions as unitary, with a single value. 
(Gershman, Pesaran, & Daw, 2009) 
Environment (including environmental responses) 
 
The third component of the Evo-Eco Components Model is the environment. Unfortunately, the 
notion of environment remains indistinct. In ecology, habitat, biome and ecosystem are all quite 
vague concepts, largely defined by the geographical features and ecological community in the 
area predominantly inhabited by a species (e.g., montane, acquatic, alpine). In evolution, the idea 
of a niche – taken as a set of ‘dimensions’ important to survival and reproduction – remains more 
abstract than is useful in the context of changing behaviour. At best, the niche has been 
conceptualized as a ‘hyper-volume’, or multi-dimensional space of resources such as nutrients, 
territory or mates used by organisms to satisfy fundamental biological needs. (Hutchinson, 1957) 
What we require is a way of gaining focus on levers and triggers of change that are extrinsic to 
people, or ‘outside’.  
 
One way of moving toward a more precise definition of ‘external factors’ is to divide environmental 
phenomena into three types – physical, biological, and social – as a function of how they influence 
behaviour. This division is supported by the sort of response that these different types of 
environment make to behaviour (a process that is part of the Evo-Eco approach – see Figure 3). 
First, the physical environment responds in simple Newtonian terms to behaviour: if you kick a 
stone, it flies away until its momentum dissipates. 5 An animal, on the other hand, can be strategic 
in its response, such as when a rabbit avoids being caught by a predator by scampering in random 
fashion across the landscape. Finally, a component of the social environment, another human 
being, will respond in potentially very elaborate ways to a simple stimulus – for example forming a 
life-long plan to get revenge for a perceived wrong (e.g., the Count of Monte Cristo). Because 
these responses occur in different ways, human brains should perceive and respond to physical, 
biological and social factors in the environment differently when producing behaviour. Indeed, it 
appears that different kinds of deductions are commonly made with respect to physical, biological 
and social objects, as suggested by the literature on ‘folk’ physics, biology and sociology. 
(Hirschfeld, 2001; Medin & Atran, 1998; Povinelli, 2000; Ravenscroft, 2010) For example, physical 
and biological objects can be distinguished in three ways: physical objects are not expected to 
have internal motivation, while biological objects are (Inagaki & Hatano, 2006); biological objects 
are embedded in unique hierarchies (i.e., the ‘tree of life’), while artifacts can be in several 
hierarchies at once (Atran, 1998); and animals don’t have specific purposes (e.g., tigers are not 
‘for’ anything in particular), but artifacts do (e.g., hammers are for hitting things). (Greif, Nelson, 
Keil, & Gutierrez, 2006) So these three types of environment are real in psychological terms, and 
hence should be distinguished in behavioural models.  
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Two other types of argument also support this tripartite division: evolutionary and ecological. That 
is, the physical, biological and social environment also differ in genetic terms: the physical 
environment doesn’t contain any genes, the biological environment (other animal and plant 
species) have a different gene pool from us, while the social environment is the current 
manifestation of our same-species gene pool. A final perspective is ecological, which makes 
reference to a species’ niche. Conspecifics have the same niche (roughly speaking) as the focal 
individual, while members of other species will have at least somewhat different niche to live in. 
However, physical objects aren’t restricted to a specific niche at all, but can exist anywhere on the 
planet’s surface. 6  
Physical environment 
 
We can use evolutionary principles to draw further distinctions and to trace the development of 
these three different types of environment. Two aspects of the physical environment can be 
distinguished in technological terms relevant to behaviour. (Robert Aunger, 2010b) First, in most 
cases – as we saw with the top public health problems above – the behaviours public health 
workers are interested in changing typically involve manipulating a technological object to facilitate 
the behaviour’s performance: condoms for safe sex, soap for proper handwashing, seat belts and 
air bags to avoid casualties in car accidents. Similarly, in marketing, the behaviour change 
problem is to increase use of particular products, which also tend to be objects, such as shampoo, 
telephones, or automobiles. Improvements in educational outcomes (another focus of behaviour 
change efforts) can depend significantly on students making better use of educational aids such 
as textbooks and computers. In all cases, these are relatively small-scale, rapidly improvable 
physical implements which are often significantly affected by use (and hence are prone to 
obsolescence). Objects are thus aspects of the physical environment which are manipulable, and 
tend to decay or get damaged as a consequence of use (e.g., chair, soap, hammer, laptop) 
(Robert Aunger, 2010b) ‘Focal’ objects are thus key to the performance of many of the behaviours 
people seek to change. Invertebrates have been shown to manipulate objects, (Kuba, Meisel, 
Byrne, Griebel, & Mather, 2003; Mather & Anderson, 1999) so this connection between behaviour 
and objects has had a long evolution. 7  
 
A second aspect of the physical environment is also specifically adapted to producing behaviour. 
However, it evolved to a very modest degree in other primates, and significantly only in humans: 
what I will call ‘infrastructure’ is the consequence of long-term niche construction, conducted by 
human beings, often over generations. 8 Infrastructure is the ‘big stuff’, often called the ‘built 
environment’ – things like a city’s electricity grid, roads, skyscrapers, or the world wide web. It 
consists of modified aspects of the environment which are relatively inert or stable when used, 
remaining in roughly the same state, leading in part to their durability. (Robert Aunger, 2010b)  
 
Thus infrastructure and objects respond differently in endogenous terms to behavioural interaction. 
Recognizing the dimensions of functionality in an object or infrastructure can help when thinking 
about how the technology itself can be modified to increase its ability to perform this function, or 
how its use can be modified by the person handling it to make use more easy or rewarding.  
 
Specific motives have evolved for interacting with the physical environment. Associated with the 
production of infrastructure (or simpler forms of environmental modification) is the motive of Create 
(all the motives we identify as having specific evolved functions are capitalized to distinguish them 
from common usage), which causes people to improve their surroundings in durable ways that are 
likely to make greater resources available for consumption in the future (e.g., by producing 
machines which increase productivity over the power of muscles alone). Objects can be Hoarded, 
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a motive designed to keep surpluses available for times when there might be a dearth of 
resources (the quintessential examples being water and food-stuffs). Also associated with objects 
is Play, a motive designed to motivate people to interact with objects, and develop the skills for 
their proper use. (Burghardt, 2005) Finally, Comfort ensures that people move away from 
uncomfortable conditions such as excessive heat or altitude. (R Aunger & Curtis, accepted) (A full 
list of all the human motives to be mentioned here can be found in Table 1.)  
 
Table 1: The Human Motives 
 
Label Motive Niche feature Theoretical problem Target 
Comfort Maintain body Ecological 
variation 
Pain  
avoidance 
Body 
Hunger Acquire metabolic 
resources  
Ecological 
resources 
Optimal foraging Biological 
environment, Prey 
[Body] 
Fear Avoid hurt-from-
without threats 
(predation) 
Predators Predation/ accident 
avoidance 
Biological 
environment, 
Predator 
Disgust Avoid hurt-from-
within threats 
(parasitisation) 
Parasites Parasite avoidance Biological 
environment, 
Parasite 
Lust Mate Sexual 
reproduction 
Mate selection Social environment, 
Relationships 
Attract Acquire high quality 
sexual relationships 
Mate  
competition 
Sexual  
selection 
Social environment, 
Relationships 
(Pair-bond)  
Love 
Maintain high quality 
sexual relationships 
Very dependent 
offspring 
Paternal investment Social environment, 
Relationships 
Nurture Rear offspring/ aid 
dependent kin 
Altricial live birth Kin selection/ 
Inclusive fitness 
Social environment, 
Relationships 
Hoard Accumulate/ defend 
surplus consumable 
resources 
Social resource 
competition 
Resource acquisition/ 
defense 
Physical 
environment, 
Objects 
Create Improve habitat Ecological 
degradation 
Niche construction Physical 
environment, 
Infrastructure/ 
Objects 
Affiliate Affiliate with groups Group-produced 
resources 
Direct reciprocity 
(reciprocal altruism) 
Social environment, 
Network 
Status Invest in status 
improvement 
Social hierarchies Indirect reciprocity 
(reputation 
management) 
Social environment, 
Network 
Justice Maintain functioning 
of large non-kin 
groups 
Ultrasocial society ‘Strong’ reciprocity Social environment, 
Network 
Play Acquire/ increase/ 
hone skills 
Learning Skill  
acquisition  
Brain, Reactive 
Curiosity Acquire knowledge 
about the world 
Memory Uncertainty reduction Brain, Executive 
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Biological environment 
 
Our basic model of the biological environment is fairly simple, as any animal only adopts a few 
behavioural relationships with other species (see Table 2). In particular, there are three ecological 
relationships: an animal can be predator or prey to other large-scale animal and plant species, or 
serve as a host or vector to pathogens, which eat one from inside. Each of these relationships is 
associated with a specific psychological motive: Disgust helps us to avoid becoming a host (or 
vector) to parasites; Hunger is designed to maximize our intake when we are acting as predators 
on plant and animal species; and Fear (via the fight/flight/freeze mechanism) evolved for dealing 
with the proximity of predators (i.e., to help us avoid becoming prey). All of these relationships 
involve a biological agent passing through the body boundary in some form (e.g., by being eaten, 
taking a bite of the person, or infecting the individual as host). More generally, Curiosity leads 
people to explore their physical surroundings, to ensure they have up-to-date information on all 
available threats and opportunities, which are primarily about locations of food, potential predators 
and pathogen habitats.  
 
More recently, however, humans have developed cultural relationships with other species. First, 
some species are used as products or to provide services (trees grown for wood, corn for fuel, 
sheep for wool, or a donkey used to pull cart). These are species we treat as if they were physical 
objects. Second, some species we see as ‘pretty’, and wish to have within view for aesthetic 
reasons, such as flowering plants and swards of grass, perhaps because they remind us of our 
ancestral condition in the African savannah. (Orians & Heerwagen, 1992) These are species we 
treat as if they were part of the physical infrastructure. Third, other animals serve as pets: animals 
we keep in close contact without eating, because we are fond of them. These are species that are 
treated as if they were members of our own species. Thus, each kind of cultural relationship to 
other species constitutes a ‘perversion’ of a different kind of relationship to the environment, either 
physical or social.  
 
 
Table 2: Types of Relations to Other Species* 
 
Name Relationship Motive Examples 
Ecological    
Predators Eats you from 
outside 
Fear Bear, lion 
Parasites Eats you from inside Disgust Bacteria, viruses, insects 
Prey You eat it Hunger cow, cereals 
Cultural    
Products You use it [Treat like physical 
object] 
Biofuels, transport 
animals, trees as wind-
break 
‘Pretties’ You tend it [Treat like physical 
infrastructure] 
Flowering plants, grass 
Pets You keep it for 
companionship 
[Treat like social object] Dogs, cats 
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Social environment 
 
The human social environment has become more complex than the biological one. Most 
invertebrates don’t have a social life, being born and then abandoned to their fate almost 
immediately. Mammals were the first large-bodied animal group to spend a significant proportion 
of their lifespans in the presence of conspecifics, with whom they had particular kinds of 
relationships. However, mammals didn’t develop significant structure within their social groups, 
which remain largely egalitarian in nature. Primates were the first in our evolutionary lineage to 
develop hierarchical societies, in which there is privileged access to resources, including mates. 
(Boehm, 1999; Mitani, Call, Kappeler, Palombit, & Silk, 2012)  
 
Humans have developed social life to a unique degree. We live in very large groups that can be 
composed of multiple sub-groups. Some of these typically meet in particular locations, with 
associated infrastructure, such as businesses, governments, sports clubs, and religious 
organisations. Such organizations or institutions can be considered forms of social technology 
which facilitate new kinds of cooperative outcomes. Each of these can be thought of as a network 
of individuals linked through particular kinds of relationships, in which each individual is playing a 
particular kind of role, to help that organization achieve its designed ends. These networks can 
have regular kinds of structures (e.g., an organizational chart with a pyramidal shape) that dictate 
the ways in which it is possible to change roles within the organization (e.g., through appointment 
to a higher-status job by consensual agreement among others in the group).  
 
More generally, social groups form networks, or structures within which one takes a place or 
position (e.g., social roles). Within these networks, there can be specific relationships, which are 
enduring dyadic interactions (e.g., mother-offspring). Playing a given role in an organization, 
network or relationship can involve activation of a particular motive. For example, Status 
maximization drives some people to become CEOs of businesses, while pleasure in skill 
development (the Play motive) leads others to become professional sportsmen. Play has also 
been extended in primates from object-play to social play, for learning the skills to interact with 
conspecifics effectively. (Burghardt, 2005) Affiliation is the motive to simply belong to a particular 
group, to share membership with others in a common goal. (R Aunger & Curtis, accepted) 
 
Interactions 
 
The three basic components also interact. Such interactions occur prominently in the production of 
behaviour itself, but also in more complex ways to be described later. 
Behaviour 
 
The nature of behaviour is constantly changing (unlike the components we talked about 
previously). As a result, behaviour is represented as a process in the Evo-Eco Model in which 
bodies interact with their environments (represented as a blur between these two components in 
Figure 3). As mentioned earlier, control over this process has developed over time. In 
invertebrates, control is limited to the production of individual actions, or short sequences that 
have been linked together in regimented fashion by genetic evolution. We can mimic this through 
habit formation, which automatically produces learned sequences of actions.   
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Efforts to achieve goals, on the other hand – regulated by the motivational system that evolved in 
mammals – enable us to chain together sequences that have not previously been performed, such 
as getting out of our seat, going to the refrigerator, fetching something from the shelf, moving to 
the oven, pushing various buttons, awaiting our food to be heated-up, putting the result on a plate, 
and heading to a table, where we sit down to eat. This entire sequence can be managed by our 
brains as a unit, ensuring that we find and digest food, thus stopping the reception of annoying 
internal signals that we are hungry.  
 
Even more long-term plans can be formed by our executive brain to help us to achieve desirable 
end-states through a sequence of goal achievements, such as going to university for several years 
to get qualifications for pursuing a profession. Humans are unique in our ability to hold such long-
term ambitions in our heads, and thereby attain end-states of high value that would otherwise not 
be reached, due to being pulled hither and thither by shorter-term goals.  
 
Thus, behaviours need not be produced independently, one after the other. Rather increasing 
levels of control over behaviour production leads to multiple actions being produced together to 
achieve more hard-to-reach end-states. The result, from an observational point of view, is that 
these actions become statistically and functionally correlated – that is, ‘chunked’ together – in time 
and space. (Ostlund, Winterbauer, & Balleine, 2009; Simon, 1974; Terrace, 2001) Behaviour has 
‘depth’ or structure, in time, because a number of behaviours can be clumped together by our 
brains, and produced as a group, in sequence, thanks to motivational- and executive-level control. 
 
Thus behaviour streams can be organised hierarchically into very long units (‘get an education’), 
long units (‘going to school’), short units called ‘episodes’ (‘finding coat’, ‘saying goodbye to 
Mother’, and ‘getting bicycle’) and very short, unconsciously executed units (‘stepping down first 
step’). (M. Schoggen, Barker, & Barker, 1963) These different scales of behavioural ‘chunking’ 
coincide almost exactly with the routine, scene, event and action hierarchies found in the literature 
on routine behaviour (Schank & Abelson, 1977). Figure 4 presents an example showing several 
levels of integration over behavioural elements, with increasingly abstract chunks of behaviour 
culminating in a behavioural routine. Behaviour thus occurs in an on-going stream, as people 
move through their environment or produce streams of audible output. We have also adapted to 
parse our observation of these movements into events and higher-order chunks, (Schank & 
Abelson, 1977; Zacks & Tversky, 2001) or in the case of speech, to perceive the stream of sounds 
as words and sentences. (Pinker, 1994) 9 As Figure 4 suggests, this ‘chunking’ of behaviour into 
higher-order units can occur recursively, so that a multi-level hierarchicalization can be performed, 
leading to quite complex behaviour patterns being controlled with relative efficiency in the form of 
daily routines. 
 
The reinforcement learning model has been augmented to deal with hierarchically organized 
behaviour. This is because standard reinforcement learning models are subject to ‘the curse of 
dimensionality’. According to the basic model, an animal can only learn to behave adaptively by 
engaging in trial-and-error learning. As a result, the time needed to arrive at a stable choice for 
action selection increases with both the number of different end-states in the environment and the 
number of available actions. In fact, the total number of actions needed to explore this space can 
increase exponentially. In a human context, with a complex environment and many behavioural 
options available, this would suggest that the standard reinforcement learning model quickly 
becomes computationally infeasible. (Richard S Sutton & Barto, 1998)  
 
One way to combat this scaling problem is to introduce hierarchical control architectures. (Barto & 
Mahadevan, 2003; M. M. Botvinick, 2008) In hierarchical reinforcement learning, sequences of 
 20
actions can be grouped into subroutines, each of which is evaluated according to its own sub-
goals. Thus, rather than select among a set of elemental actions, interpreted as relatively simple 
motor behaviors (such as grasping a spoon, scooping up some sugar, and depositing the sugar 
into a cup), hierarchical reinforcement learning allows the agent or animal to perform multi-action 
routines containing sequences of lower-level actions, casting them as a single higher-level action 
or skill (such as ‘add sugar’). (M.M. Botvinick, Niv, & Barto, 2009) These sequences, called 
options, have their own sub-goals. If a sub-goal is not met, it generates its own prediction error. 
These pseudo-reward prediction errors may not be associated with actual resources, but with 
achievement of an internally generated sub-goal that is but a stepping-stone toward the desired 
outcome. Nevertheless, the agent is motivated to reach these sub-goals, once the option gains 
control of behavior. Attaining the sub-goal yields a special reward signal, referred to as pseudo-
reward, which serves to sculpt the options policy. Placed within a hierarchical framework, pseudo-
reward prediction errors are used to learn which combinations of actions lead to a sub-goal, while 
reward prediction errors are used to learn which combinations of subroutines lead to rewarding 
outcomes. (R.S. Sutton, Precup, & Singh, 1999) It appears this is how learning in the human brain 
occurs as well. (Badre & Frank, 2012; Dayan & Niv, 2008) In particular, prediction error responses 
at different levels of a hierarchical learning problem appear to recruit the same dopamine-based 
mechanisms – that is, dopaminergic responses seem to control learning from internal sub-goals as 
well as from end-goal achievement. (Ribas-Fernandes et al., 2011)  
 
Reinforcement learning with temporal differences can thus be applied to domains with both 
sequential and hierarchical structure. Significant effort has therefore gone into the development of 
reinforcement learning algorithms which are specifically designed to operate in this kind of 
hierarchical context. (Barto & Mahadevan, 2003; Dietterich, 2000; Parr & Russell, 1998) Because 
they are associated only with the small number of actions in the subroutine, pseudo-reward 
prediction errors substantially reduce the complexity of learning. By introducing intermediate sub-
goals and arranging these into recursively more abstract structures, hierarchical reinforcement 
learning can explain the kinds of complex behaviors humans produce.  
 
In fact, our discussion of the components of the Evo-Eco approach suggests the dimensionality 
problem of reinforcement learning is not really a problem once evolutionary and ecological 
reasoning is adopted. In particular, our investigation into the environment shows that it can be 
highly refined in practice, because a niche only has a reasonably small number of dimensions, 
reducing the number of factors to which an animal must actually pay attention. Only a few 
biological species fall into relationships with humans (e.g., millions of insect species go unnoticed 
by humans), while imitation is a common way of reducing the dimensionality problem in the social 
environment: simply copy what others are doing. (Richerson & Boyd, 2005) We have shown that 
the physical environment is also concentrated into a few infrastructural complexes and focal 
objects to support specific behavioural performances. Further, behaviour itself is often controlled 
as hierarchical routines, which leads to a major reduction in the number of end-states that must be 
considered, while behavioural settings constrain the ways in which these different components can 
interact in particular circumstances, so that only a few kinds of actions are likely. Thus evolutionary 
and ecological constraints significantly limit the conceptual space that trial-and-error based 
reinforcement learning must explore to reach adaptive action selection outcomes. In ‘real life’, 
people make use of multiple ‘kludges’ that turn reinforcement learning into a tractable option for 
guiding behaviour. 
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Figure 4: A Hierarchical Behaviour Routine 
 
 
 
 
Behaviour settings 
 
A more encompassing and involving process of interaction among components occurs when 
behaviour happens in specific ‘settings’ – a particular sequence of behaviours that fulfill a 
particular function. Examples include a church service, music class in school, pub quiz, basketball 
game, or political convention. Behaviour settings are networks of constraints on how animals 
behave in specific situations. The first manifestations of settings appear in the form of rituals and 
routines. 10 The everyday activities of many animals are characterized by the stereotypical 
repetition of specific behaviours in particular sequences. It is well-known that major life events 
such as mating or territorial disputes proceed in a ritualized fashion – that is, using conventional 
signals and accentuated body movements – to secure the best outcome. (Krebs & Dawkins, 1978; 
Maynard Smith & Harper, 2003) These are situations of high risk and high reward in evolutionary 
terms; hence appropriate behavioural responses have been strongly selected, so that the best 
outcome can be most reliably secured. These adaptive responses are again likely to be the same, 
given a stable environment, so that they can become quite rigidly produced, perhaps by specific 
rules of response. Most animals, from ants to lizards to primates, also have daily routines in which 
they choose the same places and times to conduct a particular behaviour (e.g., feeding, getting 
water, marking territorial boundaries, resting, sheltering), day after day. (Lorenz, 1950; Serruya & 
Eilam, 1996; Tinbergen, 1963) Since reinforcement learning results in optimal behavioural choices 
over time, then as long as conditions remain essentially the same, the same options should be 
chosen, and the same behaviours observed – hence the high degree of stereotypy in many animal 
behaviours. Behavioral rigidity – such as the preference to engage in specific acts at particular 
places and to take familiar routes between these places – is adaptive because it allows faster 
performance and requires less attention, enabling attention to be directed to other potentially 
varying aspects of the environment, such as the presence of predators. (Barlow, 1977; Boyer & 
Lienard, 2006; Eilam, Zor, Szechtman, & Hermesh, 2006; Young, 1988)  
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Humans have elaborated such settings to a significant degree, thanks to the ability to play 
particular roles, often facilitated by modified physical infrastructures. A given behaviour setting 
often involves people interacting with focal objects (e.g., a Bible), specific kinds of infrastructure 
(e.g., a church building), and people playing complementary roles (e.g., choristers, parishioners, 
lay leaders). People can (often simultaneously) enter into an implicit contract to complete the 
execution of a particular setting, such as a church service, school class, shopping trip, sporting 
event, or private routine. Each participant plays a particular role within the setting, helping the 
group to achieve the setting’s purpose, which may be to entertain (e.g., a Broadway show), 
educate (e.g., a biology class), acquire resources (e.g., a business strategy meeting), or avoid 
some danger (e.g., a fire drill). Playing a role typically involves performance of a particular 
sequence of behaviour to facilitate completion of the behaviour setting’s function or task (e.g., the 
leader of a religious service leads the other participants through a sequence of events with 
symbolic significance). This can be considered one of the settings’ routines. 
 
Each role involving taking a particular position within the setting that is more or less central to the 
function of a setting. For example, a church service would be difficult to complete without a pastor 
to conduct it, and the organ-player is also quite important, but not as central as the pastor, while 
having a person to greet parishioners at the door is a functional luxury in many cases. It is often 
not necessary to refer to psychological states to predict the sequence of behaviour someone 
playing a particular role in a given setting will exhibit, so powerful are the regulatory pressures 
which dictate proceedings within settings. (Barker & Schoggen, 1973)  
 
Because these processes interact, through bodily development, brain-based learning and 
environmental modification, there can be consequences that are the result of this coevolution itself. 
That is, aspects of the environment can be adapted to the way brains and bodies work. Objects 
and infrastructure involved in settings often have design features that facilitate or invite the 
performance of certain kinds of behaviour – that is, they can be a component of a ‘synomorphy’. 
(Barker, 1968; Gibson, 1979) 11 This is a specific relationship between a person and an object, 
facilitated by the object’s design, in which use of the object facilitates performance of a particular 
behaviour. For example, chairs help people to rest while remaining vertically oriented for work or 
social interaction. Synomorphies are adaptive kinds of ‘fit’ between environment, brain and body. 
For example, a bar of soap has a number of features that enable it to remove dirt from hands. It is 
about the size of a hand so it can be readily picked up and rubbed; it is relatively solid, so that it 
will last a long time, yet when wet, bits can be removed through easy friction to be left on the hand, 
at which point further friction will cause the bits of soap to foam, providing easier transport of dirt 
from the hand when washed off under a flow of water. All of these represent aspects of a 
synomorphy between the bar of soap and the human hand.  
 
Settings involve dynamic, adaptive interactions between most of the components of the Evo-Eco 
Approach already described. As a result, settings are physically ephemeral in nature, like 
behaviour itself. Understanding how these components work together requires sophisticated 
investigations of the control mechanisms that manifest themselves through the dynamic interaction 
of brains, bodies and environments. For example, anyone who begins to engage in behaviours 
outside the remit of their role in a setting – such as causing disruption in a classroom – will be 
punished (e.g., by being told to leave the room) so that the other participants can achieve their 
goals. Such regulatory mechanisms can be discovered by observing them in action. (P. Schoggen, 
1989) In social settings, this means that people performing their roles can help train others to 
perform theirs more appropriately – in effect, socially reinforced behaviour change.  
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Roger Barker, originator of the behaviour setting concept, used cybernetic cycles to represent 
control mechanisms, operating not at the level of individual psychology, but at the level of the 
behaviour setting itself. (P. Schoggen, 1989) His ‘eco-behavioral operating circuits’ counter 
deviancies introduced by human or physical participants in the setting to maintain its progress 
through the setting’s dynamic agenda. These are mechanisms for controlling the performance of 
settings, keeping people acting their routines in conformity with their adopted roles, using objects 
in ways consistent with their synomorphic nature, and correcting deviations from the normal 
pursuit of the setting’s objective. He argued that these control mechanisms reside not just in 
psychological processes, but in the causal linkages between the physical, social and biological 
components of settings, making a setting a superordinate, dynamic, self-governing entity. (Barker, 
1987) Thus, it can be argued that a setting is, essentially, a positive feedback system – like 
reinforcement learning – operating at a higher level of organization. 12  
 
Figure 5 is a representation of the Evo-Eco model with the additional sub-components that have 
been mentioned here.  
 
 
Figure 5: The ‘Exploded’ Evo-Eco Model (with sub-components) 
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How behaviour has evolved 
 
This completes our review of the science relevant to the components of the Evo-Eco approach. 
This procedure of component elaboration has elucidated what content can be found within brains, 
bodies, niche, behaviour itself and settings (as the coevolutionary adaptive product of the previous 
factors). 13 This review has also presented details of mechanisms – such as levels of behavioural 
control in the brain, specific forms of learning and memory, or the operational rules of behaviour 
settings – knowledge of which can be used to manipulate behaviour in desired ways.   
 
Figure 6 presents an enhanced Evo-Eco approach, which includes a table showing how the 
content of the Evo-Eco components has developed over evolutionary time. Particular 
developments in content or mechanisms can be linked to specific historical steps of evolutionary 
development (following along the rows of the table at the bottom of the figure). In the first step, 
with invertebrates, nervous systems were simple, and so were the mechanisms associated with 
the production of behaviour. Only the earliest forms of control, learning, memory and action 
selection were available at this point. 14 Interactions with other species were limited to eating, 
being eaten, or being parasitized. Social life was nonexistent and behaviour settings consisted of 
ritualized competitive interactions and rigidly enacted daily routines.  
 
 
Figure 6: The Enhanced Evo-Eco Process Model 
 
 
 
 
 
Considerably later, with the arrival of the mammals, more sophisticated mechanisms and versions 
of behavioural processes arose. With the development of psychological rewards (primarily through 
the dopaminergic midbrain system), animals could pursue goals, and came to pay specific 
attention to behaviours associated with goal achievement, being more likely to remember these 
associations in future as well through emotional memory. Behaviour production came to be 
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chunked into related events culminating in particular end-states (called functional ‘scenes’) so that 
goals could be more reliably achieved. This was accomplished by utilizing more sophisticated 
action selection mechanisms that could evaluate alternative potential scenes through explicit 
choice over alternative courses of action more or likely to achieve goals. Meanwhile, some 
behaviours involved manipulations of the physical environment that resulted in long-lasting objects 
like cars and buildings; some interactions with these objects could be characterized as functional 
(i.e., were synomorphic). A particularly important mammalian adaptation was collecting into 
egalitarian social groups based around mother-offspring pairs. (Fox, 1984; Geary & Flinn, 2001) 
These social groups enabled new forms of cooperative arrangements that produced new kinds of 
adaptive outcomes (e.g., collective defense). 
 
Even more recently, either with the primates or our species itself, the most sophisticated contents 
and processes began to characterize the evolutionary ecology of behaviour. It is therefore often 
only within the last few million years that many of the features of human behaviour have become 
possible, such as executive level control, the production of entire routines, conscious decision-
making and learning based on reflection on recent experience. All of the behaviour produced by 
such complex psychological processes often took place in a significantly rebuilt physical 
environment, and could involve the development of cultural relationships with other species, 
hierarchically organized societies, the ‘modern’ human family based on a long-lasting pair-bond 
motivated by Love, and behaviour settings in which people played many different social roles (with 
varying levels of centrality with respect to the functioning of the setting – an adaptation made 
possible by the increased specificity of social roles in a society with a significant division of labour).  
 
All of these evolutionary developments through the phylogenetic history of our species can be 
seen as outcomes of the reinforcement learning algorithm in action over thousands of generations, 
producing a wide variety of adaptations in nervous systems and the environment, as well as 
interactions between these phenomena. Note that all of the early adaptations persist in our 
species, and should characterize human behavioural performances.  
 
The fact that a coherent ‘origin’ story can be told for the contents of the Evo-Eco approach give it 
further credence. Given its presentation of much of the detailed content of the Evo-Eco approach, 
the table in the Enhanced Model can be used as a kind of check-list against which behaviour 
change specialists look for influences on the particular target behaviour they are interested in. 
 
Using the Evo-Eco Approach to explain public health problems 
 
To demonstrate the value of the Evo-Eco approach, we now want to show how it can illuminate 
the behaviour change task. In particular, we will now look to see exactly what kinds of learning 
failures can be associated with the need to change behaviour, and whether the Evo-Eco approach 
can account for them. We will take the field of public health as our field of inquiry here, because an 
obvious consequence of maladaptation is a failure to thrive, and public health is charged with 
understanding the causes of widespread morbidity and mortality. This field should therefore have 
good evidence of the kinds of maladaptations that can arise and cause the kinds of problems that 
people want to ameliorate through behaviour change. 
 
Public health officials measure morbidity and mortality costs in terms of disability adjusted life-
years (DALYs). If we look at the top twenty risk factors associated with lost DALYs on the global 
scale today, we see that each factor can be associated with both novel technologies and particular 
behaviours (see Table 3). It is not a surprise to find that specific behaviours underlie these 
problems – hence the recognition that behaviour change is important in the public health field. 
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What is more surprising is the involvement of novel technologies such as Refined foods, cigarettes, 
condoms and cars, either as an aspect of the problem or as part of the solution for each major 
disease risk.  
 
The involvement of technology becomes more reasonable when it is realized that technological 
innovation can occur many times within a genetic generation, while the brains of individuals that 
engage in the use of technological objects are produced by genes (interacting with the body and 
environment), which are modified only once a demographic generation (about 25 years in 
humans). Since the Pleistocene, the rate of technological innovation has increased over time, 
such that it took nearly a million years for primitive hand-axes to become more sophisticated, but 
now it requires only a few years for new versions of popular devices like computers or cars to be 
produced. Thus techno-generations have become shorter in many cases than demographic 
generations. As a result, technological evolution often proceeds more rapidly than genetic 
evolution, leading to a mismatch between what brains (as encoded by genes) suggest is an 
appropriate behavioural response to some environmental stimulus, and what would actually be 
appropriate in the techno-environments created by human groups. (Curtis & Aunger, 2011) The 
result can be that environmental conditions have recently changed too rapidly for evolved 
psychological mechanisms such as reinforcement learning to cope effectively. 
 
However, there are also purely structural problems with the ways in which learning can occur in 
the cases highlighted by public health which ensure that learning is often inappropriate. We can be 
more specific about the kinds of mismatch between technological and psychological processes 
that account for major public health problems by noting that there are three kinds of ‘pathological 
process’, or conditions under which normal learning does not take place, so that the problems 
persist without being rectified through experience (see Table 4). In each case, we need to 
distinguish between the kind of feedback (in terms of resources or rewards) that arise when 
individuals interact with the technology in the way the technology was designed for (e.g., using a 
condom to engage in protected sex) and the ‘secondary’ kinds of feedback which can happen 
incidentally, and not as a primary consequence of use of the technology (e.g., using a condom as 
a balloon).  
 
The first kind of problem arises when a novel technology is highly motivating when properly used, 
but nevertheless doesn’t provide evolutionary benefits. These tend to be bio-technologies that are 
intrinsically rewarding (or mimic the brain’s own reward system), and which were designed to be 
stimulating, and hence get widely used to excess, such as synthetically produced alcohol and 
tobacco (risks #4 and 5). Essentially, the problem is that humans have difficulty controlling their 
intake because the objects are super-stimulating. With super-stimulation, the effects of goal 
achievement through behavioural modification of the environment is mimicked without the normal 
pairing of some form of adaptive behaviour with goal achievement. Hence, the behaviour can be 
considered non-functional, as it doesn’t produce any resources. Instead, a drug is simply ingested 
that provides the same effects as goal achievement directly to the brain (which reinforces an ‘easy’ 
route to reward and hence stimulates further drug-taking, and often physiological addiction as well). 
The problem is thus that a technology produces rewards that simulate the brain’s dopamine-based 
reward system, thus getting used but without any evolutionary benefit (e.g., alcohol, cigarettes). 
 
Second are novel technologies which are rewarding when properly used, but which also have 
harmful side effects (i.e., from secondary uses), such as driving. Automobiles are an excellent 
way of getting quickly from point A to point B, but because the current infrastructure causes people 
going from point B to point A to drive right alongside those going in the opposite direction, there 
are sometimes deadly collisions, essentially as a side-effect of the speed with which cars enable 
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people to move across the landscape. Thus, use of automobiles in over 99% of cases is rewarding, 
but in very rare cases can be significantly un-rewarding. However, this pattern of use teaches the 
evolved learning system that cars are such a ‘good thing’ that precautions (such as wearing seat-
belts) do not seem necessary. An example from the list of Top 20 morbidity causes is domestic 
appliances that increase productivity but can reduce physical activity to such a degree that obesity 
results (risk #10). So the side-effect learning pathology can involve incidental, or secondary 
changes in the environment as a consequence of the regular behaviour, but as such 
consequences do not always accompany the behaviour, they are not part of the normal learning 
process associated with that behaviour. Alternatively, the punishments (e.g., of obesity) are not as 
strong as the typical (functional) outcome (e.g., of reducing house work-loads), and so do not 
overwhelm the positive rewards, and therefore do not eliminate the practice.  
Third, the proper use of some novel health-giving technology may not be intrinsically motivating, or 
at least not sufficiently rewarding to inspire use (given the costs of use, perhaps), or are rewarding 
in ways that don’t lead to appropriate use (e.g., at the wrong time). For example, techno-evolution 
has thrown up some new technologies that help alleviate disease conditions, such as condoms to 
prevent the spread of sexually transmitted diseases like HIV (risk #2). However, because they are 
perceived to reduce sexual pleasure, condoms tend to be ignored. Effectively, the problem is lack 
of uptake, which makes this technology a failed solution to a problem: people are still dying when 
they need not, given existing technology (if only people would use it). 15 Lack of uptake exhibits the 
problem that the normal learning associated with performance of the target behaviour is negative. 
Hence the learning is to avoid the behaviour, as it is not psychologically rewarding. Learning is 
occurring appropriately in this case; it is just that the technological aid is not rewarding to use. 16 In 
sum, super-stimulating technologies use the body (e.g., via signals that stimulate dopamine) to 
trick the brain; lack of uptake is (an object in) the environment not providing stimulation; and side-
effect mismatch is due to the brain itself being unable to calculate the appropriate reward function, 
given the structure of experience.  
 
Table 3: Top 20 Global Causes of Lost DALYs 
 
Risk factor for 
burden of 
disease  
Health 
outcomes  
Contributory causes to 
risk factors 
Novel 
technologies  
Novel 
behaviours 
1/Underweight  Malnutrition, 
infection, low 
birthweight 
Economic factors, 
industrialisation and mass 
production of food  
Convenience 
foods* 
Loss of 
traditional 
feeding 
practices (e.g., 
bottle feeding, 
weaning) 
2/Unsafe sex STDs (HIV), 
cervical cancer 
Rural-urban migration, 
social breakdown, sex 
industry, cultural factors  
Condoms Increased 
same/opposite 
sex promiscuity  
3/High blood 
pressure 
Cardiovascular 
disease, stroke 
Industrialisation and mass 
production of food, 
sedentarisation of work 
and leisure. 
Refined salt, 
sugar, oils, etc 
Labour-saving 
and leisure 
technologies 
Over-
consumption, 
sedentary 
lifestyle 
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4/Tobacco  Cancer, heart 
disease, 
respiratory 
disease 
Industrialisation and mass 
production of cheap 
psychoactive drug 
Tobacco high in 
available nicotine 
(cigarettes) 
Smoking  
5/Alcohol Cancer, heart 
disease, 
diabetes, 
depression, 
injuries 
Industrialisation and mass 
production of cheap 
psychoactive drug 
Refined alcoholic 
drinks  
Regular and 
binge drinking 
6/Water, 
sanitation and 
hygiene 
Diarrhoeal 
disease, 
respiratory 
infection 
Insufficient public/private 
investment in water supply 
and sanitation 
Soap, toilet, water 
treatment devices 
Handwashing, 
toilet and water 
filter use 
7/High 
cholesterol 
Cardiovascular 
disease, stroke 
Industrialisation and mass 
production of processed 
foods, sedentarisation of 
work and leisure 
Low density 
lipoproteins and 
trans fats 
Use of 
processed 
foods, sedentary 
lifestyle 
8/Indoor smoke Respiratory 
disease 
Cooking with solid fuels, 
house design 
Improved stoves  Use of solid 
fuels for cooking 
9/Iron, 11/Zinc, 
13/Vitamin A 
deficiency 
Anaemia, 
malnutrition, 
infection 
Cereal-based diets, 
recurrent infection, 
helminth infection, early 
weaning 
Micronutrient 
supplements 
Consumption of 
cereals/weaning 
foods 
10/Overweight Cardiovascular 
disease, stroke, 
diabetes, 
cancer 
Industrialisation and mass 
production of processed 
foods, sedentarisation of 
work and leisure 
Refined 
salt/sugar/oils, 
labour-saving and 
leisure 
technologies  
Over-
consumption, 
sedentary 
lifestyle 
12/Low fruit and 
vegetable 
intake 
Cardiovascular 
disease, stroke, 
cancer 
Industrialisation, mass 
production of processed 
foods 
Refined 
salt/sugar/oils 
Consumption of 
processed foods 
14/Physical 
inactivity 
Cardiovascular 
disease, stroke, 
cancer 
Sedentarisation of work 
and leisure 
Labour-saving 
and leisure 
technologies  
Sedentary 
lifestyle 
15/Occupational  Injury Industrialisation Industrial 
machinery 
Interaction with 
machinery 
16/Lead 
exposure 
Cardiovascular 
disease, mental 
retardation 
Industrialisation, mass 
production of automated 
transportation  
Cars, lorries Driving 
17/Illicit drug 
use 
HIV, overdose, 
injury, infection 
Production and marketing 
of cheap psychoactive 
drugs  
Refined 
psychoactive 
compounds, 
syringes 
Drug 
consumption/inje
ction 
18/Unsafe 
injections 
Acute infection Contaminated injections  Syringes  Syringe reuse  
19/Lack of 
contraception   
Maternal 
mortality 
Cultural factors, lack of 
access 
Contraceptive 
technologies 
Uptake of 
contraception 
20/Childhood 
sexual abuse 
Depression, 
alcohol abuse 
Cultural factors 
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* Items in italics constitute technologies and behaviours that are beneficial rather than 
detrimental to health  
Adapted from (Ezzati et al., 2003); reprinted from Curtis (2012) 
 
 
Table 4: Types of pathological learning* 
 
Case Design 
Feedback 
Secondary 
Feedback 
Top 20 Risk Factors 
Normal +/– +/– [none] 
Super-stimulating ++ +/– salt, fat and carbohydrate-dense foods, tobacco, 
alcohol and psychoactive drugs  
Bad side-effect +/– – – labour-saving means of production/transport; 
syringe reuse; environmental toxins as by-product of 
industrial production, lead poisoning  
Lack of uptake – +/– convenience foods, micronutrient supplements, 
sanitation, soap, contraception, condoms, cooking 
stoves  
* The plus and minus symbols imply positive and negative reinforcement from behaviour.  
Problems thus arise when interactions between body and environment are less than optimal – that 
is, when rewards are produced without being accompanied by goal achievement (super-
stimulation), or secondary consequences (not part of the normal design loop) don’t overwhelm 
normal rewards, or when regular punishments arise (or, at best, limited reward for behaviour 
production). In each of these scenarios, the basic reinforcement learning feedback process is 
disrupted in some way. Each of these problems ‘tricks’ the learning system in a way that precludes 
effective learning.  
 
Thus, the fundamental question is how the Evo-Eco approach helps elucidate – and potentially 
ameliorate – the mismatch that appears to lie at the centre of most behaviour change problems. 
The suggestion is that the types of interventions required to change a behaviour should be a 
function of the kind of mismatch it represents. This is certainly true in the domain of public health 
(see Figure 7).  
 
Behaviours stymied by ‘lack of uptake’ have the problem of increasing the use of a novel 
technological solution. For example, hygiene problems are often due to ‘lack of uptake’ mismatch 
(e.g., of soap for handwashing, toothpaste for toothbrushing, or surface cleaner for household 
surfaces), because such products are only minimally rewarding to use. One way increased uptake 
can be achieved is by adding (perceived) value to the unrewarding object – the typical job 
performed by marketing efforts for new products (e.g., making them ‘sexy’ or ‘cool’). Alternatively, 
the technological solution can be itself improved so that it is more likely to be taken up (e.g., 
invention of a new hand cleansing technology).  
 
‘Side-effect’ mismatch cases are solved by more appropriate (e.g., safer) kinds of use of some 
technology. Here, public health workers find it very difficult to curb behaviour at an individual level, 
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so outside pressures must typically be brought to bear; hence the prevalence of legislative 
solutions for this kind of mismatch (e.g., seat belts and airbags are required components of car 
manufacturing processes; who can buy and sell guns or injection needles is severely regulated). 
Of course mandating provision of seat belts does not guarantee their use. There have been 
campaigns which have attempted to ‘make real’ the worst consequences of ‘side-effect’ mismatch, 
as in public health ads that show the death of loved ones as a result of not using seat belts.  
 
The unique aspect of ‘super-stimulating’ mismatch behaviours is that they must be stopped or 
down-regulated, not started or up-regulated. Solutions in this case often resort to legislation as 
well, because such problems just can’t be reliably motivated at an individual level. For example, 
smoking and alcohol consumption are highly regulated (who can buy, who can sell, where 
consumption is allowed), and price disincentives are brought to bear as well (e.g., high taxation on 
cigarettes and alcohol) – at least where the option of legislation is likely to be effective down to the 
individual level, thanks to good governance (e.g., in modern democracies). This category of 
mismatch has the additional aspect of dealing with the physiological dependencies that can arise 
from prolonged use. For smoking, this can be done through nicotine patches or similar methods to 
resolve nicotine dependency; alternatively, supportive social environments can be provided for 
those who wish to quit ‘cold-turkey’ (e.g., rehabilitation hostels).  
 
Note that through this argument, we have shown that the Evo-Eco approach is able not only to 
identify the most important factors underlying problem behaviours, but to explain why certain 
behaviours become persistent public health problems in the first place: a small set of pathological 
learning processes are important causes of most of the most severe public health problems at a 
global scale. 17 This investigation of the application of the Evo-Eco approach to public health thus 
suggests we are on the right track – although additional sorts of pathological learning may exist, 
and characterize other behaviour change fields, such as education or policy.  
 
It is interesting to note that each major risk factor thus has the inappropriate use of some novel 
technology as an important cause, or the appropriate use of a novel technology as a way of 
eliminating or avoiding that disease. In effect, novel technologies are either the source of each 
major public health problem or part of its solution. (This doesn’t mean that some change in 
technology is always going to be the intervention in a behaviour change campaign or program, just 
that technology frames the issue the campaign seeks to address in the first place.) What this 
analysis therefore suggests – at least for public health – is that behaviour change interventions 
should modify what these behavioural learning problems have in common: undesirable forms of 
learning from interaction with a novel technology. 
 
The Evo-Eco Approach thus suggests that behaviour change efforts should be clear about how 
the target behaviour in a given project fails to be subject to adaptive learning (e.g., by classifying 
the learning disability that lies at the heart of the problem), and how the proposed intervention 
clears the learning blockage. Similar kinds of mismatch are likely to characterize other areas 
where behaviour change is required (e.g., policy, urban design, self-help), so we suggest that this 
is probably a general finding.  
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Figure 7: Pathological Processes 
 
Super-stimulation 
 
Lack of uptake 
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Side-effect 
 
 
 
Applications of the approach 
 
To justify these assertions, we now want to show how the Evo-Eco approach can be applied to 
various kinds of behaviour change contexts. This application should show that the approach can 
identify those factors which have proven to cause problems in modifying behaviour in each case.  
 
An example from self-help: smoking cessation 
 
One such context is self-help programs. For example, helping people to stop smoking can be 
pursued at many levels (e.g., via a policy to forbid cigarette advertising or smoking in public places 
– considered in the Evo-Eco approach as part of the general niche). Here we concentrate on 
personal means of quitting, using advice taken from the American Cancer Society’s ‘Guide to 
Quitting Smoking’ 
(http://www.cancer.org/Healthy/StayAwayfromTobacco/GuidetoQuittingSmoking/index).  
 
This is seen a process (as it should be, if behaviour change requires learning), broken into four 
phases. The first phase involves making the decision to quit smoking. This must include a strong, 
personal commitment to quit by the target individual (executive control). Such a decision may 
follow a ‘tipping point’ event (i.e., point at which there is a deep recognition of the need to quit, 
perhaps because someone close developed health problems related to their smoking). This can 
involve adopting a new role (i.e., a ‘non-smoker’ identity – stored in the declarative memory 
associated with executive control). Practicing saying, ‘No thank you, I don’t smoke,’ can reinforce 
this new identity. 
 
The second phase is planning a quit date (within a month of the decision, to provide enough time 
to prepare). Preparations should include tasks such as:  
 
 Picking the date and mark it on the calendar (physical reminder) 
 Getting rid of all the cigarettes in the house, car, and at work (removing target objects 
from behaviour settings) 
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 Stocking up on oral substitutes — sugarless gum, carrot sticks, hard candy (replacement 
objects) 
 Telling friends and family about the Quit Day and setting up a social support system 
(social environment) such as a group program or a friend or family member who has 
successfully quit. 
The third phase is Quit Day itself. On this day, individuals should not smoke, keep active by 
walking, exercising, or doing other activities or hobbies (behaviour replacements), drink lots of 
water and juices while avoiding alcohol (biological environment), begin using nicotine replacement 
(object), and attend stop-smoking class (social environment). 
The fourth phase entails dealing with withdrawal, both physical (due to chemical addiction) and 
mental. Nicotine replacement and other medicines (biological environment) can help reduce the 
symptoms of chemical dependency. Sustaining the mental part of quitting can involve: avoiding 
temptation (e.g., staying away from people and places associated with smoking), and disrupting 
behaviour settings so that habits can change. Smoking typically becomes linked with specific 
situations – such as socializing with friends, at parties/clubs/bars, when taking a break at work or 
school, or while driving the car. (Best & Hakstian, 1978) It can take time to ‘un-link’ smoking from 
these settings (e.g., by taking a different route to work, or taking a brisk walk instead of a coffee 
break). In particular, breaking physical habits can be helped by choosing novel things to keep the 
mouth and hands (body) busy, such as sugarless gum or hard candy (objects), as well as 
needlework or woodworking (behaviour replacements), to provide distraction from the urge to 
smoke. Rewards can also be used (motivation enhancement): quitting smoking is not easy, so 
rewarding good practice is reinforcing: put the money saved on tobacco in a jar every day and 
then buy a weekly treat (emotional memory, associated with motivation).  
 
Finally, the ‘staying quit’ phase, during which the individual must plan for how to cope with 
recurrent temptations and the situations in which smoking used to occur. Tricks here include 
remembering that: 
 
• Breath smells better, stained teeth get whiter, yellow fingers and fingernails disappear, 
sense of smell returns to normal (body) 
• Food tastes better; everyday activities (such as climbing stairs or housework) no longer 
leave the individual out of breath (comfort motive) 
• Smoking is expensive (physical environment) 
• Smoking is less socially acceptable now (norms) 
• Smoking not only harms your health but it hurts the health of those around you (manners) 
• People with children probably want to set a good example for them (nurture motive) 
This advice, given for developing an effective self-help program to quit smoking, can be easily 
accounted for by the Evo-Eco approach. In fact, the approach justifies the advice more naturally 
than most currently popular models, as they are not intrinsically dynamic, sensitive to place and 
particular motives, nor to the use of specific objects, and effects on the individual’s body. Thus, we 
believe the Evo-Eco approach to be not only easily generalized to self-help problems, but also to 
more readily account for what is found to be significant in practice than its primary competitors: 
health psychological, social marketing and behavioural economic models. 18 
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An example from sport science: The 100 meter sprint 
 
To show the true generality of the Evo-Eco approach, we can see how it even applies to a ‘non-
traditional’ behaviour change context: improving athletic performance – the job of sports scientists. 
In this field, the classic example is the 100 meter sprint, because it constitutes the pure behaviour 
of getting from point A to point B as quickly as humanly possible. The Evo-Eco approach can 
parsimoniously explain what sport psychologists and physiologists have found to be important. 
(This section is based in large part on factors mentioned by the International Association of 
Athletics Federations’ ‘100 meters – For the expert’ 
http://www.iaaf.org/community/athletics/trackfield/newsid=4666.html, and 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/100_metres.) Recognizing the race as a behaviour setting immediately 
focuses attention on the different classes of roles: the runners, the person who fires the starting 
pistol, the person who judges the winner, and the audience. There are also important rules 
associated with this setting which define how the various players perform their roles (e.g., the false 
start rule). Further, the race takes place in a stadium with a running track of specific dimensions 
(infrastructure).  
 
The race is also recognized by sports experts as a dynamic sequence of events, which they 
describe in terms of five phases. Different elements of the model become important in each phase 
of the setting (i.e., as expected, the rules controlling execution of the setting are specific to each 
step in the functional sequence). Prior to the race, the runners can engage in role playing: 
stretching (body), goofing to the camera as a way to relax, and thus not ‘freeze up’ during the race 
(relaxing into reactive control); while others engage in psychological warfare with other 
competitors (their social environment) by ‘bigging themselves up’ (e.g., wearing gold-coloured 
shoes to emphasize their confidence of coming in first place, or getting into the blocks last). 
Athletes have also been taught to engage in repeated imaginary rehearsal of each step of the race 
(sometimes called ‘visualization’), a process enabled by executive control. They will have eaten a 
specific regimen of food at a specified period before the beginning of the race (biological 
environment) as well.  
 
In the reaction phase, the runners settle into their starting blocks (object), curl up into the 
crouching position (body), found to be best for an explosive start, and await the gun (object). 
When the gun fires, they have incessantly trained to respond automatically, in a fear-based 
(motive) startle response (reactive-level control), which minimizes the time between the beginning 
of the race-time and their progression down the track (because conscious information processing 
takes longer).  
 
Then the ‘acceleration’ or ‘drive’ phase begins, over the first 30-50 meters of the race. This is 
primarily about accelerating by using a particular ‘forward lean’ as they run while gradually 
becoming upright (body) in order to minimize the time spent at less than maximum velocity, but 
performance is also constrained by the track surface (infrastructure), interacting with the runners’ 
shoes (object). 
 
Phase three is the ‘maximum speed’ phase, characterized by stride length (body: Usain Bolt is 6’5” 
tall, and only needs 40 paces to cover 100 meters, where others require 45), stride pace and 
ground contact time, whether the track is wet or there is a head-wind (physical environment), and 
the level of the athlete’s ‘desire to win’ (status motive). This is followed by the ‘deceleration’ stage 
(over the last 20 meters), as there is an accumulation of lactate in the leg muscles and fatigue of 
the central nervous system (body; Carl Lewis slowed down more gradually than any other runner, 
allowing him to emerge in the last section of the race). Finally, there is the finish, as athletes bend 
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their torsos (body) toward the finish line (infrastructure), in competition with others also bending 
over (social environment) to snatch victory from their opponents (one competitor flung himself 
across the finish line in order to secure a medal at the 1988? Olympics).  
 
Note that, again, the Evo-Eco approach has no difficulty in accounting for the kinds of factors that 
experts in this area have found to be effective in improving athletic performance, whereas very few 
of these factors would be covered by the currently popular models of behaviour change in health 
psychology or behavioural economics. Indeed, it is instructive that the factors mentioned by 
empiricists can be found in each category of the Evo-Eco Approach (e.g., at least one factor can 
be found in the causal categories of brain, body, physical, biological and social environments, 
setting and niche) – suggesting they are all necessary components of a general framework for 
studying behaviour change.  
 
Comparison to alternative behaviour change approaches 
 
The Evo-Eco approach represents a powerful way of thinking about behaviour, and should have 
an impact on how projects to change behaviour are formulated. This is because several aspects of 
the Evo-Eco approach are radically different from current approaches to behaviour change. First, 
its theoretical foundation lies in evolutionary biology, a more fundamental science than the 
cognitive psychology on which other behaviour change approaches are based. 19 Most behaviour 
change programs derive their theoretical inspiration from the fields of health psychology and 
behavioural economics, where the most extensive efforts at theorizing behaviour change have 
been made. These fields have in turn based their theory on cognitive psychological principles. In 
particular, the currently dominant models of behaviour change – such as the Theory of Planned 
Behaviour, (M. Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010) and Health Action Process Approach (Schwarzer, 2008) in 
health psychology, and rational choice theory, (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944) used as the 
foundation for modeling behaviour in economics and political science – argue that behaviour 
maximizes expected utility. That is, behaviour is driven by the choice of that future outcome which 
is most highly valued, discounted by beliefs about how likely it is that such an outcome can be 
achieved. 20 
Expected utility maximization tends to be measured by asking people about consciously 
experienced mental constructs. Constructs are hypothetical mental states or representations, the 
content of which can be reported by individuals (e.g., in response to questionnaires). Thus, most 
health psychology research models a state of health as a function of perceived risk of disease, 
and perceived behavioural control over achieving such an end. A behavioural economist, on the 
other hand, might be interested in the perceived value of a pension of a specific size upon 
retirement as a function of the economic goods that must be foregone now to save such an 
amount. 21 Similarly, self-help programs typically rely on will-power, a high-level form of 
behavioural control which is known to be limited in important ways, (Roy F. Baumeister & Tierney, 
2012) while policy-makers have normally assumed that people respond rationally to the 
constraints their policies place on people’s activity. (Coleman, 1990; Riker & Ordeshook, 1973) 
But campaigns that emphasize enhancing knowledge or altering attitudes frequently have little 
effect upon behavior; there is often a weak relationship between attitudes and/or knowledge, and 
behavior. (Armitage & Conner, 2001; McKenzie-Mohr & Smith, 2000). This is because the 
assumption of rational or cognitive causation is often false: behaviour – or at least the behaviours 
of interest to behaviour change specialists – is often largely caused by automatic (e.g., habitual) 
processes (R. Aunger, 2007; Mittal, 1988; Neal, Wood, Labrecque, & Lally, 2012) and 
environmental factors, (Stokols, 1995) both of which are ignored by expected utility models. For 
example, many illnesses are significantly influenced by the degree of economic inequality in a 
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society, (Wilkinson, 2005) and physical activity depends upon civic resources for exercise. (Owen, 
Humpel, Leslie, Bauman, & Sallis, 2004; Sallis et al., 2006) To the extent that behaviour change 
campaigns are founded on such theory – either explicitly, or implicitly (because long exposure to 
these approaches has coloured the discourse about behaviour change to such an extent that no 
one talks of anything but psychological constructs) – this theoretical bias toward exclusive reliance 
on high-level cognitive factors can account for the rather dismal record of under-achievement in 
terms of causing widespread change.  
 
Second, the Evo-Eco approach is framed at a categorical rather than variable level. Health 
psychological models are traditionally concerned with relationships between individual variables 
such as intention or self-efficacy, while the Evo-Eco approach is couched in terms of causal 
categories like body and social environment (although structural relations between variables within 
these categories can be specified). This makes Evo-Eco a very general approach, whereas many 
health psychological approaches and behavioural economic ‘heuristics’ or ‘biases’ are designed to 
explain a specific class of behaviour. As we have shown, the Evo-Eco  approach can be readily 
applied to public health, marketing, self-help and even sport psychological problems.  
 
Third, it does not distinguish between distal and proximate causes of behaviour, with all proximate 
causes being psychological, as is true of the expectancy-value approaches. Whenever behaviour 
change models are augmented with demographic or environmental factors (M Fishbein, Triandis, 
& Kanfer, 2001; B. R. Flay et al., 2009), these tend to be included as distal variables that have no 
direct impact on behaviour, but rather filter through cognition, and so (in most cases) are not 
measured. 22  
 
In contrast, the Evo-Eco approach sees behaviour as radically embodied and situated. (Barker, 
1968; Barrett, 2011; Clark, 1997; Gibson, 1979; Hutchins, 1995) That is, factors other than 
cognition are considered active and present in the moment of behaviour, having independent 
causal influence on activity. For example, the environment is theorized to have its own structure, 
and hence plays a formative role in behaviour production, rather than being seen as an 
amorphous set of ‘barriers’ (its typical role in behaviour change models). In particular, 
synomorphies exist between people and objects, infrastructures provide larger-scale support for 
the performance of certain behaviours, and behaviour settings structure the dynamic interaction 
among these elements over time.  
 
Thus, behaviour is seen as a dynamic interaction with other model elements, rather than as the 
consequence of previous steps in a linear causal model (the ‘box-and-arrows’ diagram other 
approaches use). This forces behaviour change workers to recognize the intrinsic dynamism of 
behaviour, and its ephemeral nature, with the target behaviour occurring within a stream of prior- 
and post-activity.  Indeed, the stream of behaviour is recognized to have its own temporal 
structure, being chunked into hierarchically-controlled sequences in which there tends to be 
dependence of later events on the successful accomplishment of earlier ones (e.g., you can’t do Z 
without having done X and Y first). In this way, behaviour is seen as being intrinsically physical: it 
is instantiated as events in time and space, enacted by bodies, with the participation of organic 
brains, not calculating engines.  
 
The benefits of taking this new approach have been several. First, there are no competing 
approaches that identify the set of problems that worry behaviour change workers theoretically 
(e.g., it delineates the domain of public health concerns and provides a categorization of its 
problems). Here, this has been achieved through the argument that they arise through a mismatch 
between evolved psychological proclivities and modern, technologically modified environments.  
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Second, strong, explicit links can also be made from this theoretical foundation, to a behavioural 
model, and to the practice of intervention project design, so that formative research reflects 
theoretical concerns, and interventions can be different because of what theory says is potentially 
important, making significant behaviour change more likely to occur. 
 
Third, with its view of the brain as an evolved organ, not a failed computer (as in behavioural 
economics), the Evo-Eco approach also provides a more positive view of human capabilities: 
rather than trying to make use of ‘biases’, it emphasizes the behaviour change ‘problem’ as one of 
channeling natural, internally-generated action impulses. People are naturally active – in order to 
stay alive in constantly changing environments, we must explore our surroundings to keep up-to-
date on what threats and opportunities have arisen. (R Aunger & Curtis, submitted; Freeman, 
1999) Seeing behaviour change as helping people to harness this ‘energy’ more profitably can 
remove any stigma that the field might inspire among those who see it as controlling and 
tyrannical.  
 
Compared to health psychology and behavioural economics, then, our approach places greater 
emphasis on: 
 the physicality of behaviour (physical environment, bodies) 
 place (e.g., space with designed infrastructure) 
 time (e.g., weekends) 
 brain-based mental processes (e.g., mental representation, goal achievement, memory)  
 psychological dynamics (i.e., learning) 
 non-cognitive processes (e.g., motivation, habit) 
 bodily states (e.g., hunger, sexual arousal) 
 behavioural dynamics (i.e., setting-based routines) 
 behavioural interdependence (e.g., chunking, sequence dependence) 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we have developed a new theoretical approach to behaviour change, based in 
evolutionary biology and ecological psychology, called the Evo-Eco approach. A significant benefit 
of adopting an evolutionary approach to behaviour is that it also provides the basis for a theory of 
behaviour change: if behaviour is an adaptation, then the need for change should only arise when 
there is maladaptation. For a maladaptation to become a public concern (in education, health or 
policy arenas), it must typically be characteristic of a significant number of people for a long period 
of time (i.e., not just a transient, idiosyncratic ‘error’ in a small group) – that is, a case of 
widespread, persistent ‘bad’ behaviour. This situation is most likely to arise when behavioural 
learning systematically fails to reach optimal outcomes, because this attacks the core mechanism 
of adaptive response; in effect, the interaction between behaviour and environment is likely to be 
‘broken’ in such cases, and learning fails when the behaviour-feedback relationship is not 
normative.  
 
The Evo-Eco Approach is novel, as it has intellectual foundations in evolutionary biology, with 
content from neuroscience and ecological psychology – sources unlike the cognitive psychology 
that constitutes the foundation of behaviour change approaches in health psychology and 
behavioural economics. This science is more fundamental than cognitive psychology, and hence 
more likely to be insightful.  
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The Evo-Eco model is more general than alternatives, including explicit treatment of the 
environment and body, not just the brain, and thus provides a much richer source of potential 
insights. It emphasizes behaviour as a complex, dynamic interaction between bodies and 
environments. Hence behaviour needs looking at for proper understanding (i.e., questioning in a 
context outside performance of the target behaviour is unlikely to be very informative). (Barker, 
1968; Roy F Baumeister, Vohs, & Funder, 2007) It also suggests that behaviour change efforts 
should be clear about how the target behaviour is not subject to adaptive learning (e.g., by 
classifying the learning disability that lies at the heart of the problem), and how the proposed 
intervention clears the learning blockage. For example, hygiene problems are due to ‘lack of 
uptake’ mismatch (e.g., of soap for handwashing, toothpaste for toothbrushing, or surface cleaner 
for household surfaces), because such products are only minimally rewarding to use (mostly just 
sensory benefits). This implies that any intervention or marketing effort should ‘add value’ to such 
products through some learning mechanism (e.g., making them ‘sexy’ or ‘cool’ or by adding 
functionality to the product itself).  
 
Of course, the ultimate proof of utility is evidence that the approach changes relevant behaviours. 
In this regard, the Evo-Eco approach has been used to develop a scalable program to promote 
handwashing with soap after key events (primarily contact with faeces) in rural Indian villages; a 
randomly clustered trial showed that the practice went from being virtually absent to being 
practiced by roughly one-third of the population after a two-day visit by four health promoters to 
each village, six months post-intervention. (Biran et al., submitted) Based on this success, Evo-
Eco is currently being used to develop interventions in other projects, such as child 
complementary feeding practices in Indonesia and multiple behaviours related to diarrhea 
prevention in Zambia. 
 
Another proof of the utility of any theory derives from its ability to help people generate novel 
predictions. One such prediction from the Evo-Eco approach derives from its emphasis on role-
playing within behaviour settings, where it was assumed that the ability to learn to repeatedly 
perform a novel behaviour within a setting is affected by its placement in the setting’s routine, 
among other factors). We have demonstrated that this routine placement effect is significant when 
learning a new flossing habit. (Judah, Gardner-Sood, & Aunger, 2012) 
 
Since the Evo-Eco approach has been shown to change behaviour in public health projects, and 
to inspire new empirical hypotheses about constraints on behaviour change in real world contexts, 
we hope this evidence – of both theoretical and empirical strength – provides sufficient grounds for 
the Evo-Eco approach to be used by public health workers and (social) marketers to devise more 
effective campaigns, by policy-makers to improve general well-being, and by the general public as 
inspiration for their own self-help projects. 
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Footnotes 
 
                                                     
1 That is, it refers to stimulus-response or stimulus-response-outcome rather than stimulus-
stimulus association learning. 
 
2 Basic reinforcement learning models make learning and memory equivalent to the act of 
perceiving new states of the world; here we distinguish two separate steps: perception of the 
consequences of behaviour, and the mental processes of making inferences from what is 
perceived (learning) and then storage of those inferences (memory). This is closer in 
psychological terms to what happens in brains.  
 
3 The Evo-Eco Process Model is not a psychological model in the sense of including extensive 
predictions about information processing in the brain – that is, it does not specify particular 
relationships between mental constructs as can be seen, e.g., in the Health Belief Model (Becker, 
Drachman, & Kirscht, 1974), or expectancy-value approaches such as the Theory of Planned 
Behaviour (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980). This is because the model is couched at a higher level of 
abstraction, including many different kinds of causal factors than just cognitive ones. We don’t 
believe this to be a liability, but rather a strength, as it is much more likely that the important 
causes of behaviour will be discovered by a broader search through the kinds of factors we 
emphasize. 
 
4 The Evo-Eco approach differs from Self-Regulation and the ABC approach by being more 
specific to behaviour; these two approaches are general cybernetic models that hold for any 
homeostatic process, whether physical, biological or social (i.e., they are equally applicable to the 
description of responses by thermostats to external temperature change, animals to changed 
environments or population sizes to ecological constraints). The Evo-Eco approach differs from 
the Transtheoretical (‘Stages of Change’) approach in not being a stage model with little empirical 
support for the stages or processes specified. (S. Sutton, 2000a; West, 2005) 
 
5 What happens inside a computer can also be described using Newtonian principles, although it 
might require quite a long description. 
 
6 There are some limnal objects or states of being: artificially intelligent objects, capable of a 
strategic response, but without genes, lie between the biological and physical environments. Dead 
animals and people can probably be considered to form part of the physical environment, as their 
genes are no longer active or relevant and these objects don’t strategize any longer. 
 
7 They don’t, however, make manipulable objects – with the exception of a few spiders, which 
make webs that they can maneuver about with their legs.  
 
8 Here, I exclude the complex dwelling creation conducted by social insects such as termites, 
which create large structures using a particular kind of rigid mechanism (stigmergy), (Grassé, 
1959) or the transformation of soil layers by earthworms through continual digestion of their 
surroundings. These mechanisms are unlike the highly creative production process used by 
humans.  
 
9 Existing theories of behaviour change such as Self-Regulation theory, the ABC approach and the 
Transtheoretical Model do not recognize the impact of one behaviour on another. They think of 
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behaviour in abstract terms, such as stopping smoking or eating a healthy diet – behaviours which 
are obviously complex in many ways, including temporally. 
 
10 This argument for evolutionary precursors to human forms of behaviour settings is novel here; it 
is not characteristic of the ‘Barker school’ in ecological psychology, where the concept of a 
behaviour setting originated. Placing the notion of a behaviour setting into this evolutionary 
framework makes it closer to Caporael’s ‘repeated assembly’ concept (Caporael, 2003), which 
involves organisms, artifacts and practices being repeatedly put together for interaction as a unit of 
natural selection. Repeated assemblies are ‘recurrent entity-environment relations composed of 
hierarchically organized heterogeneous components having different temporal frequencies and 
scales of replication’. Thus, although more general (genes are taken as an example), this concept 
should include behaviour settings as an example.  
 
11 A related notion is that of ‘affordance’, associated with Gibson. (Gibson, 1979) However, it is not 
as specific, nor part of as powerful an ‘ecology of ideas’, as developed by the Barker school. 
  
12 It is important to note that this level of organization occurs between the individual and the usual 
social scientific concept of an organization, such as a business or school. In particular, multiple 
settings can occur within the operation of a social organization (e.g., ‘Mrs. Smith’s music class’ 
within a school, or ‘weekly staff meeting’ within a government bureau). This makes Barker’s notion 
of a setting different from the setting concept used in health promotion, or the WHO’s ‘healthy 
setting’ concept, which equate a setting with a hospital, village or other social organization. (Dooris, 
2009; Whitelaw et al., 2001) When necessary, the phrase ‘behaviour setting’ will be utilized to 
ensure the ecological psychological notion is distinguished from this other use.  
 
13 We exclude further consideration of the content of interventions as being a matter specific to 
particular behaviour change programs, and not much subject to scientific analysis. 
 
14 Reflexive actions could be chained together by natural selection over generations to produce 
complex behaviour sequences such as the closing up of larval cells in honeycomb by bees, but 
these were controlled in primitive fashion: each completed action was taken as a cue for the next. 
(Tinbergen, 1963) 
 
15 ‘Lack of uptake’ behaviours have been called ‘health-enhancing’ or ‘health-protective’ and 
‘super-stimulating’ behaviours ‘health-risk’ or ‘health compromising’ by health psychologists (with a 
further category of ‘health inequalities’ due to social inequality) (B. Flay & Petraitis, 1994; Morrison 
& Bennett, 2009), albeit without the same theoretical underpinnings as provided here.  
16 People may also not take up new technologies because they do not have access to them. This 
can occur when people live in the ‘ancestral state’ of pre-industrial lifestyles where the primary 
causes of early death are violence and pathogens. Lack of uptake in these cases has become a 
‘problem’ because the modern world has introduced new solutions which relatively poor people 
are not in position to adopt.  
 
17 A number of caveats should be noted here. Many factors can come into play before a learning 
problem becomes a public health problem: many people must exhibit the learning deficit, the 
environment must be characterized in specific way for the learning problem to arise and persist 
(foiling the evolutionary ‘tinkering’ of learning mechanisms), the learning deficit must relate to a 
significant health outcome, a tenable solution must be evident (or the ‘problem’ simply has no 
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‘solution’), and social institutions must recognize the problem as a problem. Also, admittedly, 
behaviour is only one aspect of these problems: for example, the AIDS epidemic is also caused by 
challenges to the human immune system presented by a fast-evolving, virulent virus, and under-
nutrition by geopolitical and economic inequalities. Further, in some cases, a public health 
intervention need not require behaviour change at all. For example, iodine was introduced into salt 
in some countries by governmental decree, producing health benefits for the population, but 
without requiring people to engage in any novel behaviour, nor to stop doing anything in particular, 
but simply to continue consuming salt. Nevertheless, we have shown there is a common link 
among all major global public health problems, which is that the behavioural underpinnings – such 
as inadequate uptake of condoms or adherence to anti-retroviral therapy in the case of AIDS – can 
be explained as a kind of inappropriate or unfortunate learning, and that there are strong linkages 
between these learning difficulties, behavioural problems, risk factors and public health issues.  
 
18 However, this advice has partly grown from studies using one of the health psychological 
approaches which is not based on expectancy-value, the Transtheoretical model, (Prochaska & 
DiClemente, 1983) which is processual in nature, but still would not identify many of the factors 
mentioned in the advice explicitly.  
 
19 Evolution has been called the most powerful idea ever, a ‘universal acid’ for solving problems. 
(Dennett, 1995) Although both utility theory and evolutionary biology are functionalist, biology has 
the edge in supplying us with content about what we should value. The expected utility concept is 
agnostic about what things can hold utility for people, while the concept of adaptation in 
evolutionary biology can be used to elucidate what kinds of behavioural outcomes promote well-
being (through survival and reproduction). 
 
20 A few alternative models are available, primarily the Social Ecology approach, (Stokols, 1992) 
Diffusion of Innovations model, (Rogers, 1995) Transtheoretical approach, (Prochaska & 
DiClemente, 1983) and Social Marketing approach, (Kotler, Roberto, & Lee, 2002) but each of 
these occupies a small, specialized niche in the practical world of behaviour change programs. 
 
21 Even a recent effort to broaden consideration of the influences on behaviour by taking a ‘meta-
theoretical’ approach, the Triadic Influence approach (B. R. Flay, Snyder, & Petraitis, 2009), winds 
up arguing that all of the new influences (genetic, cultural and social environment, personal traits) 
work through the normal expectancy-value factors (e.g., attitudes, self-efficacy and intention) in a 
proximal sense to cause behaviour. So practictioners can still get away with measuring just the 
same set of factors as before when using this approach.  
 
22 Fishbein’s ‘Integrative Model of Behaviour Prediction’ (M. Fishbein, 2008) does admit that, in an 
unspecified way, the environment can directly hinder or facilitate behaviour; such constraints are 
argued to be the reason why intention does not always fully explain action.  
